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In recent years, a new regulatory and philosophical approach has affected
the communications industry.! Starting with the deregulation of some equipment
services by the FCC in 1968, and through the divestiture of AT&T which was
effective January 1, 1984, technology, markets, and regulators have fundamentally
altered the structure of telephone and related services.2 These changes have led

to a re-evaluation of the traditional form of cost-based regulation at all levels of
government.3 Ohio's adoption of House Bill 563 represents yet another step in

* Professor Frank P. Darr, J.D. The Ohio State University (1982); B.A. The University of Akron (1979).
'See generally M. DERTHICK & P. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985).
2
See, Levitz, SeparateSubsidiaries,the Interim Cost Manual andAT&T Divestiture, in THE IMPACT OF
DEREGULATION AND MARKET FORCES ON PUBIuC UTILIIES: THE FUTURE ROLE OF REGULATION 209
(1985).
3
ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §40-281(E) (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §§40-15-101 to 40-15-404 (Supp. 1989);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§16-247f(b), 16-247i (West Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §364.337 (West
Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §46-2-23 (Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE §§62-601 to 62-622 (Supp. 1989);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 13-101 to 13-803 (Smith-Hurd 1988); IND. CODE-ANN. §§8-1-2.6-1
to 8-1-2.6-8 (Burns 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. §476.1 (West Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§484.103a-f (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§237.57-237.711 (West Supp. 1991); MISS. CODE
ANN. §77-3-35 (Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§392.190-392.530 (Vernon Supp. 1990); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§69-3-801 to 69-3-824 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§86-801 to 86-811 (1986); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §704.040 (MVichie Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§63-9A-1 to 63-9A-20 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§49-21-01 to 49-21-22 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§4927.01 to 4927.05 (Anderson Supp.
1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§757.810-757.870 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §58-9-230 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1989);
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this transition.
On March 17, 1989, the adoption of Amended Substitute House Bill 563
significantly changed Ohio laws's coverage of some of the services provided by
telephone companies. 4 However, new provisions do not mandate a different
regulatory approach. Rather they place the ability to alter the basic structure of
regulation in the discretion of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO).
Before a telephone company may offer services at prices set by market forces
rather than regulatory fiat, the PUCO must make a determination that deregulation
of the service is in the public interest and that there is either competition for the
service or rehsonably available alternatives.5 Thus, the PUCO is directed to
make a determination about its continuing authority to regulate telecommunications.
The Commission's ability to regulate under House Bill 563 raises some
questions concerning the nature of future telephone service. The statute itself
recognizes some of these concerns in that it directs the PUCO to maintain
universal and low cost basic telephone service while promoting continued
innovation, diversity of supply, and regulatory flexibility. 6 However, as noted
by several witnesses during the legislative hearings on the new law, the statute
fails to provide specific guidance regarding the balance to be struck among these
factors.7
In any case, it is not at all clear that the commission will even use its new
authority. Prior to and after federal divestiture and deregulation, Ohio communications regulation has been structured to maintain the position of the existing
companies, which hold monopoly positions over facilities. This regulation may
have also created significant subsidies which deregulation and a competitive
environment will not support. However, as noted above, there are significant
pressures which may not permit the commission to continue that approach.
Furthermore, it may not be in the best interest of the local exchange companies
for the commission to do so. Whether the competing concerns of low costs and
maintenance of subsidies and universal service can be accomplished within this
new environment remains a difficult, if not impossible, question to answer. It is
clear that the commission will need to adopt alternative forms of regulation (and

S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 49-31-1 to 49-31-4.3 (Supp. 1990); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c
(Vernon Supp. Code Ann. §§54-8b-1 to 54-8b-4 (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§202c-d, 226a, 227a
(Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE §§80.36.300-80.36.380 (Supp. 1991); WiS. STAT. §196.195 (1987-88).
4 Codified, in part, at OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4927.01-05 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
5 OHIO REV. CODE § 4927.03 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
6 OHIO REV. CODE § 4927.02(A) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
Testimony of MCI Telecommunications Corp. at Hearing on H.B. 563 before the Subcommittee on
2
at 2 (undated).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
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deregulation, in some cases) if the apparent goals of the legislation are to be met.
To this end, the commission might consider using its new authority in a
manner which is consistent with the basic economic model on which it appears
to be based. In theory, at least, the commission could deregulate those services
that are competitive and adopt price regulation which encourages better
performance of telephone monopolies for those services which are not in
competitive markets. To accomplish these goals, the commission must consider
tools that it has not used in the past, and it may be forced to draw from the
antitrust literature for some guidance. While these changes pose some significant
departures from traditional regulation, they also present a better method of coping
with various competing interests and changes in the marketplace which appear to
be inevitable.
In order to address the various concerns raised by this general grant of
authority given to the commission, this article is divided into several sections. Part
I reviews the market changes that exist and which, in part, drive the regulatory
changes and have emerged because of them. Parts II and III establish the basic
regulatory schemes that existed prior and subsequent to divestiture and deregulation at the federal level. Part IV sets out the Ohio regulatory structure which
previously controlled the actions of the Ohio commission. Parts V and VI then
address the response of the Ohio commission and supreme court to the changes
at the federal level and note some potential institutional barriers to deregulation.
Part VII introduces the legislative response to deregulation, House Bill 563. Part
VIII then suggests how the commission may use the economic model on which
deregulation and divestiture are based and suggests some concerns drawn from
antitrust and regulatory literature about developing effective regulatory oversight
of the monopoly and "competitive" portions of the Ohio telecommunications
market.
THE CHANGING MARKETPLACE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Change is a truism of telecommunications in all respects. In part,
technological innovation in the market triggered these changes. As a result of
innovation, some writers suggest a fundamental breakdown in the market
divisions recognized in the federal, state, and judicial definitions that governed

telephone service!

Though regulation remains a significant element in the

telecommunications business which is likely to continue, 9 it is no longer business

as usual for the regulators, the regulated, or the consumers. The changing market
has seen to that.
8

McKenna & Slyter, The Modificationof FinalJudgment: An Exercise ofJudicial Overkill, 9 COMM/ENT

9, 14 (1986).
Published
by text
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
9 See infra
accompanying notes1991
586-692.
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Market Changes
One of the keys to understanding the rapidly changing legal environment
is to look at the effects which the FCC and judicial efforts to deregulate have had
on the telecommunications market. Market segmentation, price and cost shifting,
and the introduction of new players and services are some of the more dramatic
outcomes.
First, market shares have shifted. AT&T has retained dominance in the
interstate market with a seventy percent share, while MCI has as much as twelve
percent, and Sprint has eight percent. '0 While the AT&T market share has
decreased, total traffic has increased.'
One must also be sensitive to divisions within the markets. According to
one survey of eighty-seven companies, the AT&T share appears to be decreasing
in the business market. AT&T held sixty-two percent, MCI twenty-seven percent,
and Sprint ten percent.1 2 The erosion of the AT&T market share will likely
continue as corporations seek to diversify their supply of communications
services. Customers appear to be responding to concerns about transmission
3
quality, reliability and price, rather than an interest in brand loyalty.'
At the same time, new efforts are developing in various segments of the
market that did not previously exist. The residential and small business portions
represent seventy percent of the total long distance market.' 4 To make up for
income lost as a result of the decreasing margins available in the large business
sector, there is increased pressure on the long distance carriers to seek residential
and small business customers.' 5
Segmentation is translated into specialized products by several competitors. AT&T has promoted a number of special rates differing from its standard
MTS (measured toll service) tariff for the small residential user. "Reach Out
America" is for the large residential user, "Pro America" is aimed at the small
business, and "Megacom" is for the large business.' 6 AT&T has also sought to
'0 Carnevale, Finance World Is Newest Turf in Phone Battle, Wall St. I., Nov. 15, 1989, at B 1, col. 6 and
B7, col. 1.
"J. HORNINo, R. LAWTON, J. RACsTER, W. POLLARD, D. JONES & V. DAVIS, EVALUATING COMPETITIVENESS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS: A GUIDE FOR REGULATORS 102 (1988).
'2 Carnevale, supra note 10, at B9, col. 1.
'3

Id. at B9, cols. I and 2.

,4 Id. at B9, col. 3.
'5 Keller and Carnavale, Long-Distance Battle Shifts to Homes, Small Businesses, Wall St. J., Dec. 20,

1989, at B1. col. 3.
16 Trebing, Apologetics of Deregulation in Energy and Telecommunications: An Institutionalist

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
Assessment, 20 J. ECON. ISSUES 613, 622 (1986).
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provide highly specialized tariffs for several large customers.17 Other interexchange carriers have responded innovatively. To encourage additional calling
during low usage periods, MCI has introduced discount calling plans for
residential callers and tie-ins with other companies such as American Aiflines."
Second, price effects are an interesting element of the deregulatory mix.
In some instances, prices are tightening. Though there is some evidence of limit
pricing in the telecommunications market,19 the cost of long distance service
decreased thirty-nine percent between 1984 and 1989.20 Corporate communications costs have been reduced by as much as fifty percent.21 At the same time,
the spread between AT&T and its competitors predictably decreased as the
handicapping created by regulation has eased.' On the other hand, local rates
increased about thirty-five percent based on a five year average, 23 though the
increased costs may have been offset by the freedom to purchase telephone
equipment and the net reduction in rental costs for phones.2 Overall, the cost
of telephone service has increased by about sixteen
percent, which when adjusted
25
for inflation results in a slight decrease in cost.
A third obvious effect of recent changes in regulation is the greatly
increased entry, the variety of products and services available for telecommunications and diversification. In private point to point communications, one of the first
areas to develop along competitive lines, there appears to be a healthy competition, though market shares would still indicate a dominant position for AT&T.2 6
The Bell companies have sought to enter international markets as a means of
finding new sources of revenues under divestiture.2 7 Making use of IBM's radio
system and Motorola handheld computers, the two companies will offer a service
by which computers can be taken directly to the field and communicate

17 See infra text accompanying notes 238-45.

', Keller and Carnevale, supra note 15, at B2, col. 4 (For each one minute of service, the customer
receives five frequent flier miles.).
'9 Trebing, supra note 16, at 622.
20 Dealmakers Are Burning Up the Phone Lines, Bus. WK. 138, 139, March 13, 1989 (hereinafter as
Dealmakers).
2t Labich, Was Breaking Up AT&T a Good Idea? FORTuNE 82, 83, Jan. 2, 1989.
22

Trebing, supra note 16, at 618-19.

23 Labich, supra note 21, at 82. From 1983, long distance rates decreased twenty-eight percent and

intratstate rate two percent while local service increased forty-three percent, according to AT&T. Tanzillo,
Flood Gates Open, COMM. NEWS, Jan. 1989, at 49.
24 Labich, supra note 21, at 83.
2

Id. at 83.

26L

HORNING, R. LAwrON, I RAcSnER, W. POLLARD, D. JONES & V. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 32 n. 12.

27 Dealmakers,
supra note 20, at 144.
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 2
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:2

information back to corporate computers." Despite some early failures, AT&T
appears to be successfully moving into the area of computer sales, especially in
some targeted markets requiring high speed minicomputer applications.2 9
Locally, Ohio Bell and other local exchange companies have filed tariffs for the
provision of caller identification, automatic call back, and phone screening.30
In summary, following deregulation and divestiture, the telephone system
looks less like a single network. In its place, several potentially competitive
markets have emerged.
The Role of Competition in the Future
For the future, the role of competition is both certain and enigmatic. 31 The
Justice Department study prepared by Peter Huber for the first triennial review of
the Modified Final Judgment 2 offers a strong suggestion that competition will
be at the heart of the interstate and intrastate telecommunications markets.
Arguing that the system will move to greater decentralization, with more paths
between points (the "geodesic network"), Huber suggests that the current industry
strategy is to design methods to bypass the local operating companies.3 3 In
particular, carriers are attempting to avoid the use of switching and local
transmission facilities that form the basic bottleneck associated with local
service. 34 Local exchange carriers face competition for switching from private
branch exchanges (PBXs) and direct interconnection with the interexchange
carrier. Additional competition for specific segments of transmission may arise
from satellite and data services.35 In addition to competition in switching at the
local level, there exists competition for hauling or transmission in the form of

28 Carroll, IBM, Motorola Plan Radio Link for Computers, Wall St.

., Jan 29, 1990, at B1, col. 6.

29

Keller, Reaching Out: In Computer Industry, No One Is Laughing At AT&7s Effort Now, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 12, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
30 Lafferty, Busy Signals: High Technology May Soon Pit My Phone Against Your Phone, Columbus

Dispatch, Jan. 14, 1990, at CI, cols. 1 and 2.
31"Emerging competition in [the local services market] consists of PBX and CENTREX competition and
competition for operator services. The competition in the PBX and CENTREX market is largely for
custom-built switching systems. ... [C]ustom-made orders are not conducive to tacit collusion. The
competition for operator services is largely between AT&T and the local operating companies. These
services are largely homogeneous. Customer purchases of most telephone services tends [sic] to be
frequent, small, and regular which is a condition favorable to tacit collusion. The existence of posted

tariffs for nearly all telephone services compounds the conditions already present for tacit collusion." J.
HORNING, R. IAWTON, J. RACSTER, W. POLLARD, D. JONES & V. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 33.
32See infra text accompanying notes 148-76 and 246-60.
33See P. HUBER, TIE GEODEsIc NETWORK: 1987 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY

1.8 (1987).
34Id.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
3s Id. at 2.13 to 2.18.
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private lines, microwave, and fiber optic systems. 36 Indeed, one of the curiosities
of the current system of regulation is the aspect of local exchange companies
providing a private line service to interexchange carriers which bypasses the local
exchange network.37
On the other hand, there are several potential barriers to the creation of
the competitive network described by Huber and others. Huber himself describes
some of the problems that may prevent the interconnection necessary to relieve
the bottleneck that currently defines monopoly local service and potentially
prevents effective competition at all levels of the telecommunications system.
First, high costs of entry exist in many markets.38 Second, the fundamental
structure of the telecommunications system remains basically unchanged, despite
the rapid movement of computer technology into various telecommunications
functions.39 It still requires a line connecting two points; the local component
may always be essentially a monopoly based on scale economies. Third, the

market remains highly concentrated in several areas where competition would
appear most likely to occur.40 Moreover, in areas where monopoly connections
are truly significant, such as local exchange service, the concentration is even
more obvious. 4' Finally, there remains the residual problem that only the
affluent can afford the range of opportunities that may develop.
The major carriers can build around the [Regional Bell Operating
Companies]. They will resell [Regional Bell Operating Companies] services while they do, and then migrate major customers
on to fully independent, end-to-end, service networks when the
job is completed.

36id.

37 Id. at 3.27.
3sEven in the competitive equipment market, there is some doubt that one could consider it "contestable"
within the meaning suggested by the economic theorists. See id. at 1.12 ("Building the next generations
of optical super-switches and super-computers will require enormous concentrations of capital, talent, and
This not a market that the largest players enter
sustained engineering effort. ...
lightly, or that smaller players enter at all."). In the area of enhanced services, the barriers to entry (such
as exorbitant start up costs to establish them) are extremely high, while the cost of use by additional
customers is low. Id. at 1.25.
39
1d. at 1.18. There are no effective substitutes in the market for local exchange company access for small
users. Id. at 3.7.
40
Enhanced communications services tend to be very concentrated. "'Two firms provide 70 percent of the
public packet switching service in the U.S. ... In voice storage and retrieval services, the top four firms
hold over 50 percent of the market; in electronic mail, the top three have over 80 percent." Id. at 1.25.
Nearly eighty percent of the switched access lines are controlled by the Bell operating companies. Id. at

2.5.
41IntraLATA toll amounts to about a third of all switched toll traffic and about a quarter of toll revenues.
Id. at 3.5. The Bell operating companies account for nearly all of this traffic and revenue within their
areas. Id. Nationally, the local companies earn about $15 billion in revenues from the service. Id. This
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
problem may be compounded by the lack of equal access that remains. Id. at 3.15.
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... [T]he [Regional of Bell Operating Companies] will remain
system integrators for the poor, the tired, and the hungry. 42
Others have forcefully argued that the future portends limited competition.
For example, Kenneth Flamm tends to discount the likelihood of significant
success by telecommunications companies in entering other high technology
areas.43 Flamm further rejects the notion that a fundamental shift in costs that
would result in decentralization of the telecommunications network has
occurred." Flamm also suggests that the costs of producing the geodesic
network suggested by Huber will generally be higher than the traditional
centralized network, but will offer safer performance (redundancy and lower level
of casualty from interruptions of service).45 Whether this tradeoff is sufficient
to fuel growth and competition is uncertain.
It may be fairly concluded that some portions of the telecommunications
market are not competitive.46 This is particularly true of the local exchange
monopoly that is maintained by current regulation. The Bell operating companies
continue to retain a heavy concentration of the local and access market. In 1988,
access charges amounted to $20.4 billion (about 20 percent) of Bell company
revenues.47 Furthermore, even the most generous economic theory does not seem
to support deregulation of some Bell services.48
Nor is this situation likely to change, according to some writers. In
contrast to the conclusion reached by Huber that the growing interconnectedness
results in a reduction of monopoly control, Lee Selwyn suggests the maintenance
of the network itself is a factor which will result in increased dangers of
bottleneck control.49 Moreover, the extent to which the current competition in
the long distance market is the result of current pricing and other handicaps
imposed on the divested Bell system or successful competitive entry is not

42 Id.

at 1.23.

4' Flamm, Technological Advance and Costs: Computers versus Communications, in CHANGING THE
RULES: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN COMMUNICATIONS

13, 58-59 (R. Crandall and K. Flamm, eds. 1989).
4Id. at 60-61.
4- Id. at 408-10.
" Selwyn, Assessing Market Power and Competition in the Telecommunications Industry: Toward an

Empirical Foundationfor Regulatory Reform, 40 FED. COMM. B.J. 193, 196 (1988).
47 Irwin, The Demise of State Telecommunications Regulation? TELECOMM. 70 (Dec. 1986).
' See Gabel, Deregulation:Should the Local Telephone Market be Next? 24 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 39
(1989) (arguing that the theory of contestability did not apply to the local provision of dial tone and

access service).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
41 Selwyn, supra note 46, at 201-07.

8

Darr: Telephone Services
Fall. 19901

TELHONE SERVICES

clear."0
Finally, consolidation appears to be growing at the same time that
increased competition and entry are possible due to the reduction of regulatory
barriers. Consolidation is particularly evident in the area of equipment production.51 Some analysts believe that current consolidation will result in five or six
giant firms. 52 The effects of consolidation, however, may be limited by the
introduction of foreign competition. This is, in fact, already happening. A nearly
ten-fold increase in the foreign trade deficit in communications equipment
occurred with deregulation.53 In sum, the future of competition is far from clear
or certain.
The State-Local Market and Competition

The problems of deregulation really manifest themselves at the local level.
The market for equipment and long distance services that formed the first wave
of deregulation was, in its own way, relatively discrete. Deregulation at the state
level, however, more closely touches sensitive political and economic nerves.
Much has already been written about the intractable problem of subsidies and
their maintenance in an age of deregulation. In particular, a growing amount of
bypass may threaten to expose the remaining customers to much higher telephone
costs. In addition, regulatory control is difficult to maintain in a partially regulated
environment with limited state resources. Labor consequences are also an
immediate and real fallout. Finally, change increases consumer dissatisfaction with
telecommunications services. These problems reflect back to legislators and
regulators in a way that often makes the rhetoric of deregulation very difficult to
implement.
First, deregulation has upset the balance of apparent local subsidies under
the prior federal-state scheme.m Historically, three forms of subsidy existed
within the regulatory structure. Long distance service provided a subsidy to local
service. Business rates subsidized residential rates. Averaging of rates created a
subsidy from lower-cost, high-density urban service to higher-cost, low density
rural service. 5 As discussed more fully below,56 political pressures preclude

'0 Kahn & Shew, CurrentIssues in Telecommunications Regulation: Pricing, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 191,
192 (1987).
"' Dealmakers, supra note 20, at 138.
53

Id. at 139.
Labich, supra note 21, at 85.
In addition to the text that follows, see infra text accompanying notes 94-107.

"

Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly LiberatedMarketplace, 75 CAL L. REv. 1005, 1028

52

(1987).
5
6 See infra
text accompanying notes
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991201-13 regarding access charges.
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rapid migration from those policies. "The court [in ordering the divestiture of
AT&T] may have altered the industry's structure, but it has not yet curbed the
general political appetite for subsidized local telephone service. The result thus
far has been ad hoc political intervention in an effort to accommodate the
mutually exclusive goals of (court-supported) cost-based
prices and (congressios7
nally and regulatorily supported) subsidized prices.
Because of past regulatory practice, utilities and their customers face
significant cost shifting if large customers migrate away from the monopoly
system and strand prior investments made on their behalf on the remaining
customers. Bypass of the local system appears to be a real growing concern.
Major business customers have led the way in the use of bypass technologies with
the creation and purchase of fiber-optic equipment, satellite antennas, microwave
systems, and digital switches. 8 An effect of bypass is to eliminate customers
which provide the most substantial portion of toll revenue, and in some cases the
loss of the customer is permanent. 59 Moreover, some firms that have bypassed
the telephone system now offer to sell their excess capacity to others, which
aggravates the problem, by compounding the effects. 60
An example of a growing bypass method is a fiber-optic system to
connect the end user to the long distance provider. This carriage, which is called
local transport or teleports, in essence bypasses a portion of the local system that
carries messages from the local switch to the interexchange carrier.61 On the
positive side, the provision of local transport by fiber-optic carriers may provide
for some efficiencies of scale based on improved technology, lower construction
costs, and the aggregation of traffic. Teleports may also provide superior grades
of service at a better price, 62 and a back-up to traditional phone carriage.63
However, on the negative side, there is the potential that prior investment to serve
the former customers will be stranded and the costs shifted to the remaining, less
flexible and affluent customers.
Among smaller users, there also exist opportunities for bypass in the form
of shared systems. In a shared system, the tenants of a building or several

s MacAvoy & Robinson, Losing By Judicial Policymaking: The First Year of the AT&T Divestiture, 2
YALE J. ON REG. 225, 261 (1985).
5 Irwin, supra note 47, at 72.
'9Note, Local Access Bypass, 37 FED COMM. L.J. 325, 340-41 (1985).
60Irwin, supra note 47, at 74.
61 Radford, Fiber-optic Networks Nibble Away at the Bell Local Monopoly, 124 PUB. UTIL FORT. 4, 4-5
(Dec. 21, 1989).
62Lopez, Fiber-Optic Network Take the Baby Bells by Surprise, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1989, at B1, col.

6.

61ld. at B4, col. 3.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
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buildings combine their telephone needs through a private switch and take
advantage of the economies of scale to lower their costs.6 In effect, several
customers act as though they had the same phone needs of one very large
business. Like corporate bypass, the problem with shared tenant services is the
likelihood that the loss of large users of the system will result in stranded
investment and a potential increase in rates to the remaining customers. To some
extent the costs of service will be decreased by the loss of customers. On the
other hand, certain fixed costs may not be recovered, and will have to be spread
among the remaining, less flexible customers.6 5
Second, changes in the regulatory and industrial structure place additional
demands on regulators. A partially deregulated system presents opportunities for
the remaining monopoly to leverage its monopoly power in competitive
markets.6 Recent evidence suggests that just such action is likely. An FCC audit
determined that purchases by regulated utilities from unregulated subsidiaries of
Nynex (one of the holding companies created as a part of the AT&T divestiture)
were padded by as much as $120 million. In effect, the unregulated subsidiary,
inflated prices of goods and services provided to the regulated subsidiary, which
had adopted a policy to purchase its capital equipment from the unregulated
entity.6 7 The monopoly customers thus were paying a premium that was passed
back to investors.
Third, there have also been significant labor effects of deregulation. In
attempts to lower labor costs, many of the regional holding companies have
directed major labor force reductions. 68 A Pacific Telesis plan called for the
elimination of 11,000 of 69,000 jobs. Bell Atlantic planned to eliminate 1,200
positions, US West offered early retirement incentives to 20,000 of its 22,000
managers, and Nynex offered a similar plan to 10,000 of its 27,000 management
employees. 9
Finally, the deregulation of various services has resulted in consumer
disenchantment due to the loss of a single provider for all parts of the system. In
the case of phone equipment, for example, "[t]he customer can no longer simply
rely on the telephone company to provide a quality instrument and to replace or

6See

infra text accompanying notes 409-29.

6Powers, Public Interest Implicationsof Telecomnmunications Deregulation, 16 POL'Y STUDIES J. 146,
150-51 (1987).
" See infra text accompanying notes 121-23.
67 Wilke & Carnevale, Nynex OverchargedPhone Units for Years, an FCC Audit Finds, Wall St. J., Jan.
9, 1990, at Al, col. 6 and A6, cols. 1-4
" Lopez, Pacific Telesis Plans Job Cuts of About 11,000, Wall St. I., Jan. 5, 1990, at A2, col. 3.
69 Id.
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repair that instrument as needed. '70 There is also a growing awareness that
competition is not a panacea for all problems. A recent analogy is cable
television. Rapid increases in rates and subscriber complaints of price gouging
have resulted in congressional proposals to regulate cable television by permitting
additional local regulation of prices.7 A similar episode relating to telecommunications emerged in the area of alternative operator services.72
These complex economic, political, and legal effects in telecommunications offer a striking contrast to the relatively predictable environment that existed
prior to deregulation. However, the assumptions that deregulation drives this
change are themselves a partial result of the perceived failure of the stable system
of cost based regulation to meet societal goals.
THE TELEPHONE MONOPOLY AND ITS REGULATION
Prior to deregulation and divestiture, regulation of telecommunications at
both the federal and state level followed the basic "rate of return" regulatory
model. In fact, the actions of the regulatory commissions and the Justice
Department helped create the vertically integrated structure of the industry and
maintained it for several decades by protecting it from competitive forces.
Inherent in that choice was faith in rate-of-return regulation and a complicated
federal-state arrangement of costs to promote low-cost local service.
The Theoretical Structure of Monopoly Regulation
In the traditional model of welfare economics, regulation is justified in those
instances in which market failure lead to inefficiency. 73 First, an industry may
be regulated so that its prices reflect the full costs, both internal and external, of
its production. A common example of this form of regulation is that established
to internalize the cost of pollution.74 Second, regulation may be used to reverse
the effect of informational difficulties. For example, "[a] role for government may
arise if workers remain ignorant of [a] risk to their health.... [G]overnment may
exploit its coercive sanction and economies of scale in the collection, analysis,

70 Powers,

supra note 65, at 148.

"' Carnevale, Congress Seeks to Rein In Cable TM, Wall St. J., December 11, 1989, B-I, col. 4. Potential
competitors have complained that the deregulated cable television companies have used the excessive
profits from captive customers to buy up programming and competitive systems. Id. at B-1, col. 6.
72 In October 1990, Congress passed the Telephone Operator Consumer Services Act. The Act requires
alternative operator services to provide extensive information to consumers and threatens full price
regulation is the market fails to drive price down. 136 Cong. Rec. H8744 (daily ed. Oct 2, 1990). See
Darr, The Regulation of Alternative OperatorServices, _ HIGH TEcH. L.J. _
(forthcoming 1991).
Aranson, Theories of Economic Regulation: From Clarity to Confusion, 6 J.L & POL 247, 249-50
(1990). See generally, S.BREYER, REGULAToN AND ITs REFORM 15-35 (1982).
7
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74 Aranson, supra note 73, at 250-52.
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and dissemination of information to overcome this problem."" Third, government may intervene by direct price regulation in those industries in which
monopolies develop due to production factors or government intervention. In the
case of a natural monopoly,76 the government substitutes price and entry
regulation because the market power of the monopolist will permit it to establish
prices above those a competitive market would provide."
Rate regulation of a natural monopoly is premised on a "compact"
between the utility and the state. The compact "promises a utility the opportunity
to earn a reasonable return on its investment in exchange for the utility's
obligation to serve all customers in its service area free of retail competition.01
The rate-making formula used by commissions to establish what a utility is
entitled the opportunity to earn is rather innocent looking: Revenue = Operating
Expenses + (Rate of Return x Ratebase).79 Operating expenses are those costs
associated with providing utility services.80 Rate of return is a weighted average
of the cost of debt and equity to the company." Ratebase consists in general of
the cost of equipment necessary to provide the required service, less accumulated
depreciation.8s The formula is deemed cost-plus because the utility recovers its
expenses and a return on its investment.
Initial FederalRegulation of Telecommunications
Federal regulation of communications adopted the basic rate of return
model of regulation. In 1910, Congress passed the Mann-Elkins Act, providing
for the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to regulate interstate telegraph
and telephone services. 83 Following its approach to the regulation of railroads,
the ICC imposed a uniform system of accounting and initiated valuation
studies." However, due to the limits of ICC efforts and the growing telephone
market, and prompted by presidential encouragement of a separate regulatory

" Id. at 254.
'16
A natural monopoly occurs when a single company is the most efficient means of supplying a market
because it has a declining marginal cost over the relevant market. Id. at 253-55.
17 Id.

at 255-58.

" Steinmeirer. Where Theory Meets Reality: The Case Against PUHCA "Reform," ELECTRICrY J. 50 n.7

(Jan./Feb. 1990).
79 E. GELLI-ORN & R. PIERCE, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 89 (2d ed. 1987); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS OF LAw 321 (3d ed. 1986); F. WELCH, CASES AND TEXT ON PUBLIC UTIrFY REGULATION 258

(rev. ed. 1968).
so R. POSNER, supra note 79, at 321.
Sl Id.

E. GELLHORN AND R. PIERCE, supra note 79, at 107. 131-34; J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
UTILITY RATES 191-223 (1961).
53 Pub. I. No. 218, 36 Stat. 539 (1910).
52
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agency, Congress passed the Federal Communications Act of 1934.5
Initially, the Act created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
and directed it to regulate in a manner which would provide "rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide" service "with adequate facilities at reasonable prices," assist in the
national defense, promote safety, and centralize regulation. 86 However, jurisdiction extended only to interstate and international communications. Intrastate
communications remained a matter for the states.8
The Act fails to define explicitly the kind of regulation that the FCC is
supposed to engage in. Instead, it directs the FCC to regulate so that there is the
provision of adequate services at just and reasonable rates. 88 It further directs
that common carriers may not discriminate in rates or services.89 It requires that
tariffs be filed with the FCC,90 sets up a complaint process, 9 permits the
commission to value property using original cost methods, 92 and requires
determination of public convenience before installation or abandonment of lines
is permitted.93 Finally, the common carriers are directed to file annual reports
and debt in accordance with accounting standards
describing their costs, equity,
94
established by the FCC.
Though the Act did not prescribe a particular formula for setting rates, the
FCC followed an original cost approach consistent with the rate of return model.
In a series of investigations spanning over thirty-five years, the FCC adopted
original cost valuation and revised depreciation schedules. 95 Following these
efforts, the FCC revisited the basic rate of return mechanism in a second major
series of investigations from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. 9 6
Though the FCC's efforts developed along the traditional line of rate of
return regulation, the commission did face one rather unusual and recurrent

s Id. at 636-37.
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).

37 47 U.S.C. §§ 152(a) & (b). For a discussion of the recent problems the dual structure of regulation has
caused, see Darr,Overview, in 13 Public UtilitiesLaw Anthology xvii (1990).
" 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
9 Id. § 202(a).
90

Id. §§ 203 & 204.

9' Id. §§ 205, 208, & 209.
92Id. § 213.
93 Id. § 214.
94Id. §§ 219 & 220.
" C. PHILLIPS, supra note 84, at 639.

9Id. at 610. For a summary of the 1967 orders concerning rate base, depreciation, and separations, see
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problem: the division of revenue between the long distance monopoly, the AT&T
Long Lines Department, whose rates it regulated, and the Bell and independent
operating companies that connected with Long Lines for the completion of
interexchange calls, whose rates state commissions regulated. The process devised
pursuant to the Communications Act 97 was called "separations and settlements."
Acting through a joint board of federal and state officials, the FCC set three
formulas for the distribution of funds. "Separations" served to allocate the costs
and revenues between federal and state jurisdictions." "Settlements" allocated
revenues between Bell and independent phone companies. 99 "Division of
revenues" then allocated revenues between AT&T Long Lines and the Bell
operating companies.'00
"Separations" was the key to the problem. The joint board attempted to
allocate costs on the basis of actual use. 10 ' To the extent that particular costs of
interstate and intrastate service could be identified with a particular service, that
cost and the resulting revenues were distinguished. However, the remainder,
which was used for both local and interstate service, was allocated on the basis
of relative use.' 2 The relative use formula then could be modified with the
effect of shifting costs, a potential form of subsidy. In fact, modifications in the
separations formula from 1959 to 1970 resulted in a transfer of cost responsibility
in the range of $500 million from local to long distance service. 103 Estimates
placed the actual usage of the system for long distance at roughly eight percent,
while the contribution to costs was almost 26 percent.' °
In effect, monopoly and its resulting regulation permitted regulators to
reallocate costs through separations."' Though some of the literature is less than
conclusive about the nature of the subsidies,1t 6 the effects of past practices in
retrospect seem relatively clear in that access and connection charges shifted costs
back to local service and away from interexchange.

97 47 U.S.C. § 410 (1982).
9, C. PILUIPS, supra note 84, at 206 n.32.
99Id.
1

Id.

101

Id. at 206-07.

102

id.

00

103Id.

"Back to the Future": A Model for Telecommunications, 38 FED.
COMM. L.L 145, 176 & n.88 (1986).
105The state regulatory commissions and the FCC established a process for separations and settlements
'04 Fowler, Halprin, & Schlichting,

through a series of agreements that resulted in the adoption of separations manuals. C. PHILmIs, supra

note 84, at 206 & n.33.
6 By one measure of subsidy, Tenin and Peters found that a substantial cross subsidy ran from

interexchange to exchange service. Temin & Peters, Cross-Subsidization in the Telephone Network, 21
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The overpricing of toll services prior to divestiture developed as
a convenient means for state regulators to cross-subsidize local
telephone service. The excess charges on AT&T long-distance
calls were transferred to local telephone exchange carriers
through a complicated settlements process. As long-distance costs
fell, the federal-state regulatory board that controlled regulatory
cost allocations decided to allocate an increasing share of the
local nontraffic sensitive costs to the interstate long-distance
services, thus increasing the degree of cross subsidy.10 7
At the same time federal regulatory agencies were attempting to apply
regulation to AT&T, Justice Department actions sustained the ability
of
return
rate
to subsidize by isolating the company from competitive markets.'0° Initially, the
Department stalled Bell system efforts to buy its telecommunications competition
at the local level. In the Kingsbury Commitment of 1913, the company agreed to
avoid further purchases of local operating companies and to provide interconnection to independents for long line service. 10 9 This commitment resulted in joint
network planning in which the AT&T Long Lines Department controlled long
distance and the Bell operating companies and the independent exchange
companies operated the local exchange." 0 A 1956 consent decree directing
AT&T to make its patents available, precluding it from providing nontelephone
services, precluding its Western Electric subsidiary from manufacturing
nontelephone equipment, and requiring Western Electric to disclose its costs
further isolated AT&T.'
Thus, the initial regulation of AT&T at the federal level evidenced an
apparent faith that monopoly regulation was the appropriate paradigm. The FCC
sought to apply rate of return regulation, and the Justice Department sought to
eliminate the specter of a huge monopoly player from related competitive
markets. As a result, AT&T held an enormous portion of the telecommunications
market. Prior to the divestiture, the Bell system accounted for eighty percent of
local calling and ninety percent of long distance communications."' These
Crandall, Surprises from Telephone Deregulation and the AT&T Divestiture, 78 AEA Papers and
Proceedings 323 (May 1988). "The policy of restricted entry also allowed cross-subsidization of telephone
tariffs. Rate-averaging has resulted in cross subsidization between high and low user density routes, high
and low population density areas, and large and small volume interexchange users. Heavy cross-subsidization also developed between interexchange and local services." Knieps & Spiller, Regulating by Partial
Deregulation:The Case of Telecommunications, 35 AD. L. REv. 391, 396 (1983).
'07

'0 For a discussion of the early Justice Department antitrust actions against AT&T, see Peters, Is the
Third Time a Charm? A Comparisonof the Government's Major Antitrust Settlements with AT&T this
Century, 15 SETON HALL L REv. 252 (1985).

'09 C. PHIliPS, supra note 84, at 621-31.

,0 Id. at 631.
"'

Id. at 634.
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numbers made sense if the industry was a natural monopoly. At the same time,
however, changes were taking place that challenged the paradigm.
Despite the attempts to isolate AT&T, the system of regulation was
economically unstable. The manner of regulating telecommunications presented
some basic problems, apart from arguments concerning its efficiency in particular
segments of the market and the likelihood that the "regulated captured the
regulators.""1 3 Subsidies were at the root of the concerns. The subsidies created
incentives for others to enter the market to siphon those customers who were
paying the subsidies and could be offered less expensive rates for the same
services. 4 The subsidies likewise created a strong incentive for discriminatory
behavior on the part of the existing monopolies and their regulators
to prevent the
5
entry of potential competitors that would upset the program."
Consistent with these economic concerns, policy changes were afoot to
deregulate portions of the market. In particular, the FCC began to permit limited
entry into the equipment and long distance markets." 6 This policy shift created
several incentives which worked against the balancing act represented by the old
system of dual regulation. The players acted as expected. When the FCC
permitted the entry of competitive equipment, one of the complaints concerning
AT&T tariffs for attachment of foreign terminal equipment centered on the rates
that rendered the use of the competitive equipment uneconomical." 7 Likewise,
as competition was introduced in the long distance market, AT&T allegedly made
interconnection with local markets more difficult and introduced tariffs selectively
to avoid competitive encroachment over vulnerable routes." 8 AT&T's response
then set
off an explosion of antitrust litigation which ultimately led to divesti9
ture.,

1

An extensive literature concerning the effectiveness of regulation has developed. Itis outside the scope

of this article to discuss that matter. For a discussion of the literature, see R. HORwrrz. Ti
REGULATORY REFORM 22-45 (1989).
"4 Temin and Peters, supra note 106, at 205-06.

IRONY OF

15 Besen and Woodbury, Regulation, Deregulation, and Antitrust in the Telecommunications
Industry,
28 ANTrrRusT BULL 39, 43 (1983).
"16See infra text accompanying notes 136-47.
"7 Besen and Woodbury, supra note 115. at 43.

"'

Id. at 45.

19 See infra
text accompanying notes
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THE SHIFT IN FEDERAL REGULATION' 20
The TheoreticalFramework of Partial
Deregulationand Its Limitations
Once the monopoly paradigm is challenged, a substitute must be found.
In those industries in which both competition and monopoly exist, the practical
and political problems of regulation become significantly more difficult. When the
monopolist operates in both the competitive and noncompetitive market, two
economic problems emerge. First, the monopolist may seek to tie its product to
the sale of the competitive product or may discriminate against the competition
in the sale of the competitive product.121 In communications, for example, the
monopolist has control over the last link to the customer and can use that to
leverage higher rates for access to other services requiring that access. Second,
the monopolist may misallocate the cost of its competitive service to its regulated
one, thus giving it an additional advantage of lower costs in the competitive
market.'22 The example of NYNEX overcharging its customers for equipment
bought from its competitive subsidiary is an example of this problem. 3 These
outcomes of entry by a monopolist thus dictate a more complicated response by
the regulator.
The logic of the competitive market would require the regulator to isolate
1 24
the competitive and noncompetitive services and respond to each accordingly.
First, the commission would identify those services that are competitive and
would deregulate them. The regulator would identify those that are not competitive, due to some sort of market failure, and would structure the appropriate form
of regulation to address the market failure.125 For those services offered by
either the divested entities or competitors that require access to monopoly
services, the commission would continue to set nondiscriminatory access charges.
In form, the program is simple. Reality will prove the program more difficult to
implement.
First, there will be an ongoing problem of noncompetitive subsidies. Even

For a rather complete discussion of the regulatory revisions which took place at the FCC and in the
court hearing the divestiture case, see Dempsey, Adam Smith Assaults Ma Bell with His Invisible Hands:
Divestiture,Deregulation,and the Need for a New Telecommunications Policy, 11 CoMM/ENT 527, 538'20

572 (1989).
121

Brennan, Why Regulated Firms Should Be Kept Out of Unregulated Markets: Understanding the

Divestiture in United States v. AT&T, 32 ANTITRUST BuLL. 741, 749-57 (1987).
'22

Id. at 757-64.

123 See

supra text accompanying notes 66-67.

124Brennan, supra note 121, at 770-72.
'2'

If the problem is one of natural monopoly, the response is greatly different than if the problem is one
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within this framework, there are two opportunities for cross-subsidization. First,
interexchange carriers might attempt to subsidize services in competitive service
territories from less competitive ones. Second, some of the interexchange carriers'
services may be used to subsidize other services within a service area (although
this requires that the services be somewhat differentiated.) 26
Competition may serve to check the use of subsidies. "It is argued that
although some telecommunications markets are regulated, the presence of
competitive alternatives in those markets reduces the likelihood of successful
cross-subsidization. For example, the availability of facility bypass technologies
(e.g., microwave facilities) as an alternative to switched access services reduces
the likelihood that exchange carriers could recoup target market losses with access
service revenues, even though access service revenues are derived from regulated
rates." 27 However, the results of competition on subsidy are far from predictable.
Political constraints to removing subsidies also exist. It may not be a
policy that is consistent with political will. (The recent Ohio experience, discussed
more fully later, demonstrates that.128 ) For example, commissions may desire
to retain some subsidies to account for concerns about universal service. Yet, if
cross-subsidies exist in the current rate structure, these will be incentives for
competitors to enter and skim off parts of the market. Thus, "[i]f the public
authorities desire both subsidizing prices and economies of scale, then the
coercive authority of the government must be employed to restrict or prohibit
entry into the market."' 29 Government intervention then runs against the grain
of deregulation.
Due to the competing economic and political agendas, pricing access
remains a fundamental problem. 30 While the competitive solution would be the
application of marginal cost principles,'13 the nature of the entity being regulated may cause undesirable results. Moreover, the cost shifting from pricing access
and other services at marginal cost may result in a decline in the welfare of the
lowest third of the population. Approximately eighty percent of the benefits

HORNING, R. LAWTON, J.RACSTER, W. POLLARD, D. JONES & V. DAvis, supra note 11, at 137.
Larson & Sievers, On the Effectiveness of Price Floors in Telecommunications Regulation, 25

'26J.
'7

WILLAMETrE L. REV. 89, 95-96 (1989).
''
329

See infra text accompanying notes 327-514.
Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization:Pricing in Public Enterprises, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 966, 972 (1975)

(emphasis deleted).
130See infra text
131 Since

accompanying notes 209-211.

the cost of access is not a joint cost in the economic sense (ie. access cost is not a fixed

proportion of usage cost), marginal costing is the appropriate formula for setting cost of products. Kahn
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would flow to the highest one-third of the population."
The major concern is the recovery of costs. Under monopoly there is a
tradeoff between efficient pricing and covering costs of production. On the one
hand, marginal pricing will result in supracompetitive profits if marginal costs are
increasing. If costs are decreasing, marginal pricing will result in revenues less
than costs and may require a government subsidy to restore profitability to the
regulated entity.1
Another problematic consideration for the commission is the likelihood
that its role in the market place will actually increase. One of the outcomes of
partial deregulation already noted at the federal level is the increased scrutiny
necessary to regulate on a service-by-service basis.134 Commission involvement
at the state level is also likely35 to increase as the level of detail and the number
of potential entities increase. 1
These basic concerns and tradeoffs of partial regulation are readily
apparent in the federal efforts. On the one hand, federal efforts have broken the
back of the former paradigm and its subsidies. On the other, the FCC has faced
considerable political wrath and incurred new regulatory duties to make the
system work. The result is a significant experiment in determining whether partial
regulation is viable.
The FCC's Actions Priorto Divestiture
Small cracks in the monopoly paradigm appeared in the 1950s, and major
change was. well on its way by the 1970s. The movement at the FCC to
deregulate saw two primary candidates, equipment and interexchange carrier
service.
The FCC directed its earliest efforts at deregulating the monopoly control
over equipment. In 1956, the commission approved the attachment of a cup-like
device that shielded conversation noise over a challenge by AT&T that the
attachment threatened the integrity of the telephone system. 136 Twelve years
later, in the Carterfone case, 137 the FCC opened the door to real competitive
entry in the equipment market by permitting the attachment of foreign equipment

132Id.

at 253-54.

'33

J. HORNING, R. LAWrON, J. RACSTER, W. POLLARD, D. JONES & V. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 78.

'3

See infra text accompanying note 689.

"5

Knieps & Spiller, supra note 107, at 403.

13

Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).

Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Tol Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, aff d on reconsideration, 14

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
F.C.C.2d 571 (1968).
'37

20

Darr: Telephone Services
Fall, 1990]

TELEPHONE SERVICES

(non-Bell owned) to the network. The FCC, however, spent seven more years

before it approved a process for making attachments. 38 The transition prior to
divestiture essentially ended with the Computer 11 decision to deregulate all

customer premises equipment, permit end users to seek out the most appropriate
provider on an unbundled basis, and permit some competitive activity in computer
related services (referred
to as "enhanced services") on the part of AT&T, through
139
separate subsidiaries.
Parallel with the decisions concerning equipment, the FCC, with prodding
from the courts, opened the way for the introduction of competitive carriers into
the interstate interexchange market. Initially, the FCC permitted creation of
microwave facilities for the private carriage in the Above 890 docket.4 It then
approved point-to-point service between St. Louis and Chicago by MCI in

1969. "" "This approval prompted a deluge of applications seeking authorization

of similar microwave facilities.' ' 142 The FCC responded with a rule that
permitted carriers to provide private line services. 43
Court action broadened the effect of the rule-making as MCI sought, in
effect, to provide interstate common carrier service. Initially, the FCC attempted
to restrict the scope of the service by prohibiting MCI from offering two-way
common carriage through its system.'" The court of appeals reversed the
commission and later directed it to approve a tariff filing authorizing the
service. 4 5 Finally, the FCC approved the sale of competitive common carrier
services in 1981.146

'
Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Telephone, First Report and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975),
modified on reconsideration, 58 F.C.C.2d 716 (1976). Second Report and Order, 58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976),
affd sub nom., North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
874 (1978).

'" Second Computer Inquiry, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, modified on reconsideration, 84 F.C.C.2d
50 (1980), further modified on reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), affd sub nom., Computer and
Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C.Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).

"4 Allocation of Frequencies in Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959), modified on reconsideration, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960).
'~'

Microwave Communications Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969).

',

Fowler, Haprin, and Schlichting, supra note 104, at 155.

Specialized Common Carrier Services, First Report and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, affd on reconsideration, 31 F.C.C.2d 1106 (1971), affdsub nom., Washington Util. Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142
(9th Cir 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975).
" In the matter of MCI Telecommunications Corp.-Investigation into the Lawfulness of Tariff F.C.C.
'+

No. 1 insofar as it Purports to Offer Execunet Service, 57 F.C.C.2d 271 (1975), reversed sub nom., MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
" MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nora., United
States Independent Tel. Ass'n v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 439 U.S. 980 (1978).
'4

In the Matter of Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and
445 (1981), affd, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982).
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The decisions to permit attachment of foreign equipment and interconnection of other common carriers fundamentally upset the process of regulation of
the Bell system and the process of revenue distribution. Pricing access from the
local exchange companies to AT&T and the other common carriers became
critical. The local companies needed compensation for the connection of their
facilities to the new companies. However, because the local companies were
under the AT&T umbrella, AT&T had an opportunity to discriminate against its
long distance competitors by denying access or discriminating on price. The initial
solution was the creation of the Exchange Network Facilities Interconnection
Agreement (ENFIA), essentially access charges to be paid by the interexchange
companies for connection to the local exchange companies. The ENFIA program
sought to set out tariffs for access during a transition to complete interconnection.
Initially the FCC and the parties allowed for a form of handicapping. During the
transition, ENFIA rates for access were substantially lower for the new entrants,
such as MCI, because the service was not as good as that provided to AT&T
Longlines. 147
Thus, the basic components of the partial deregulation model were in
place by the time of divestiture. The commission began with an approach that
directed nonmonopoly services to be more competitively structured and allowed
interconnection. As indicated in the Computer IH decision, competitive and
noncompetitive portions of the market were separated. A form of access charge
was created. On the other hand, some basic problems became evident. Pricing
access, in particular, was subject to factors other than purely economic concerns.
Handicapping and maintaining subsidies were already apparent.
Divestiture of AT&T 4 s
At about the same time, divestiture resulted in judicial supervision of the
Bell system. 4 9 In 1974, the Justice Department filed suit against AT&T alleging
numerous antitrust violations. As part of the settlement which resulted in the
case, the plan of reorganization adopted pursuant to the 1982 Modified Final
Judgment (MFJ) separated the long distance portion of the company and created
seven regional holding companies to provide local exchange service and access

147

Fowler, Halprin, and Schlichting, supra note 104, at 178.

"8 There is a wealth of literature discussing the divestiture of AT&T from a variety of viewpoints. The

notes throughout this work contain references to some of them. For a discussion focusing on the
personalities of the participants, see S. COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY (1986). For a discussion of
the internal efforts of AT&T to restructure the company, see W. TUNSTALL, DISCONNECTING PARTIES,

MANAGING THE BELL SYsTEM BREAKUP: AN INSIDE VIEW (1985). For a bibliography of divestiture
literature, see Pinheiro, AT&T Divestiture and the Telecommunication Market, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 303
(1988).
'4 Technically, the decision applies to AT&T and the resulting Bell companies. The effect of the decision

as it defines the kinds of limits placed on other federal and state agencies. See, e.g.,

is much broader
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 1008-10 (D.D.C. 1983).
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for the interexchange service. Consistent with the model of partial regulation, the
MFJ placed numerous restrictions on the kinds of business that the regional
holding companies could enter. 50 Three fundamental restrictions applied to lines
of business precluded the holding companies from providing interexchange
communications or exchange services, manufacturing telecommunications
equipment, or providing any other service except exchange access that was not
regulated as a natural monopoly. 15 However, the court did permit the company
to market equipment,'52 provide yellow pages directories, 53 and enter new
markets so long as the company could demonstrate "that there is no substantial
possibility that it could use its monopoly power to impede competition in the
market it seeks to enter."1'
In its initial enforcement of the divestiture order, the court demonstrated
a single-mindedness consistent with the model of partial deregulation. Under the
court's scrunity of the MFJ, the Bell Operating Companies' function was to
provide monopoly services and access. 5 5 This view flowed directly from the
court's decision concerning the merits of the government's case on an AT&T
56
motion to dismiss filed at the completion of the government's case in chief.
In two areas, control of the customer premises equipment and interexchange
access, the court found that AT&T's control of access served to preclude
competition. First, the court found that the government had sustained its burden
of proof concerning the uncompetitive practices of the company in requiring
"protective connecting arrangements" for the attachment of foreign equipment to
the phone network.157 The court found the arrangements were unnecessary to
protect the integrity of the system, overengineered to increase the cost of the
product so as to make them uncompetitive, and were often delayed by AT&T to
the detriment of equipment suppliers.' Second, the court concluded that the
government had sustained its burden of proof concerning the failure of the
company to provide access to other interexchange carriers. Relying on a theory
of "monopoly bottleneck" that required the company to make the monopoly local
exchange facilities "available to its competitors on fair and reasonable terms that

I" United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-34 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 460 U.S.

100 (1983).
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 227-28, 231.

"'
52
1'

Id. at 231.
Id.

I"Id. at 225.
"s

McKenna & Slyter, supra note 8, at 22.

"'

United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981).

'
Id. at 1349. Until the FCC adopted a certification process for the attachment of foreign equipment,
AT&T was permitted to require the use of attachment devices as a means of protecting the integrity of
the phone network.
ISO
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'
do not disadvantage them,"159
the court found that AT&T used its tariffs to
impose conditions that were discriminatory, refused interconnection, discriminated
on the price of access, entered into bad faith negotiations, and ultimately gouged
on rates for less than high quality access.' 6

Additionally, the court found several other features of AT&T's activities
that appeared anticompetitive. The government demonstrated some efforts at
below cost pricing in the private line market as evidence of anticompetitive
intent.16 1 It also showed that AT&T sought to limit purchase decisions of the
operating companies to Western Electric products.' 62 The court addressed this
concern by noting that excessive costs of equipment may have flowed to Western
Electric through rate regulation.163 Fundamentally, the court felt that the
government had demonstrated that AT&T's control over the local monopoly
placed it in a position to prevent the introduction of competition in both the
equipment and interexchange markets.
The court's concerns were borne out in the its modifications of the
consent decree, entered into between the government and AT&T, for the
divestiture of the company. The court felt that control of the local facility
permitted subsidization of the interexchange carrier and barriers to access. 164 (It
is interesting to note that the cost shifting has since been in the other direction,
with the effort directed at forcing additional costs on the local exchange
companies on the basis of removing past subsidies.165)'To that end, the court
agreed to exclude the local exchange companies (the agreement refers to them as
the Bell Operating Companies or BOCs) from those activities by which the local
exchange bottleneck would permit them to discriminate. l 6 Thus, the court
placed line of business restrictions on the operating companies, preventing them
from entering interexchange service, information service, or manufacturing
telephone equipment."6 In each case, the court determined that the local
exchange monopoly provided the operating companies with the incentive and
opportunity to impede competition and the restriction would on balance contribute
to competitive markets. On the other hand, the court determined that the sale of

139 Id.

at 1352-53. For a discussion of the essential facilities doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes

626-56.

'60United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. at 1353-57.
"' Id. at 1364-70.
'
Id. at 1371-72.
'I
Id. at 1373.
16

United States v. American TeL & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 162-63, 165 (D.D.C. 1982).

16

See infra text accompanying notes 201-13.

United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 188 (interexchange services), 189
(information services), and 190 (equipment manufacturing).
'

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
167 Id.

24

Darr: Telephone Services
Fall, 1990]

TELPHONE SERVICES

equipment did not present a competitive threat since there were not any
significant common costs, collusion with manufacturers was unlikely, and a
significant counterbalance in the form of Western Electric served to frustrate
anticompetitive behavior.16
The court also introduced an element of "public interest" rationalizing in
its modification of the agreement. In its review of the agreement, the court
concluded that federal antitrust law required it to make a determination that the
settlement was in the public interest.1 69 The court identified the public interest
to be the maintenance of competition. 170 The court stated, however, that other
policies were relevant in determining the proper remedy if the court "concluded
that the decree unnecessarily conflicts with important public policies other than
the policy embodied in the Sherman Act."171 The court's modification of the
provision of the MFJ concerning the creation of advertising directories was a
good example of how the court looked to policies other than antitrust to justify
its actions. The court offered two reasons for transferring the right to produce
advertising directories to the operating companies. First, it found that the transfer72
was justified as a means of avoiding further concentration in the market.1
Second, the court felt that the transfer was a means of providing an additional
subsidy to the local exchange companies, as directory services tended to earn
substantial profits. 173 (Again, there is an apparent contradiction in the nature of
the subsidies associated with the prior system of separations.) In a sense, the court
took on the role of a regulator seeking to protect the financial integrity of the
local exchange company, an unusual stance indeed.
In addition to prohibiting the operating companies from engaging in
certain lines of business, the MFJ also directed the companies to provide equal
access. The court directed that access be phased in over several years, but also
found that absolute parity was not required due to some practical problems. 74
Thus, the court approved differences in dialing requirements, resulting in dialing
additional digits for connection to some carriers other than AT&T. 175 The court
further suggested that the imposition of differentials based on quality of service

'a d.at 191-92. See also United States v. American Tel. & TeL Co., 1982-2 Trade Cases (CCH)

64,980

(D.D.C. 1982).
10 United States v. American Tel & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 149.
170id.
17'

Id. at 151.

'72

Id. at 193.

7

Id. at 194. This entrance into areas other than more narrow antitrust concerns would reappear again

as the FCC attempted to shift additional costs away from interexchange rates. United States v. American

Tel. & Tel. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 998 (D.D.C. 1983).
'74 United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 196-97.
'75 United
States v. American Tel.1991
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& Tel. Co., 552 F.Supp at 197-98.
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17 6
be set by regulatory commissions.

Continued FCC and Judicial Supervision
Since the approval of MFJ and the introduction of competition in the
interstate market, the FCC and the district court have faced the ongoing challenge
of maintaining competitive aspirations through numerous requests from AT&T
and the local companies for expanded authority. These requests have met with
mixed success.
1. FCC Actions
After the Computer I decision, the commission faced a series of
questions concerning the creation and financing of the AT&T separate subsidiaries
and the use of sister (regulated) company resources for unregulated sales. 77
Throughout 1983 and 1984, the FCC reported on its progress in monitoring
AT&T's efforts to create its independent subsidiary.178 At the same time, the
FCC was struggling with the task of setting a new separations policy for revenues
related to the new AT&T structure created by Computer H1.179
Given the difficulties the federal commission was experiencing with the
Computer II separate subsidiary requirement, it followed that it would seek to
develop an alternative for the local exchange companies. The Third Computer
Inquiry, begun in August 1985,80 sought methods of avoiding the monitoring
problems while addressing the loss of efficiency created by the separate
subsidiaries requirement. In June 1986, the FCC issued an order with several
basic findings.'' The commission concluded that basic voice and data services
would remain regulated, enhanced services would remain unregulated," s and
structural separations could be removed under certain circumstances. If the
telephone company established nondiscriminatory interconnection through open
network architecture (ONA) and comparably efficient interconnection (CED, it
could be relieved of the requirement of separate subsidiaries. The commission

at 199.

'76

Id.

"7

FCC ANNUAL REPORT 46-47 (1982).

"I FCC ANNUAL REPORT 44-45 (1983); FCC ANNUAL REPORT 43 (1984).
179
180

FCC ANNUAL REPORT 48 (1984).
FCC ANNUAL REPORT 38 (1987).

,' Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulation (Third Computer Inquiry),

104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986). vacated sub nom, California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (1990).
One of the findings of Computer H was that enhanced services such as data manipulation would not
be regulated. AT&T, however, was excluded from the market at the time because of the computer
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
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ordered local exchange companies to file ONA proposals by February 1,
1988.183 On December 22, 1988, the commission approved (with some qualifications) the general direction of the proposals submitted by the regional companies.'" In essence, the plans provided for "unbundled" service offerings that
could be used by enhanced service providers at prices and a quality that would
be available to all providers, including those affiliated with local exchange
companies. 8 5 Thus, the commission reasoned, the former barriers to entry on
18 6
the part of monopoly providers of local connections could be removed.
Regulation of carriers was also changing. Following the FCC's approval
of interconnection with other carriers, the commission determined that it would
not regulate carriers lacking market power and would suspend regulation of
resellers from tariff regulation.8 7 Known as the Competitive Common Carrier
cases, the FCC's decisions attempted to determine the kind of regulation
necessary in a market filled with several very large companies and many new
entrants.
In the first decision in the docket, 88 the commission divided the
telecommunications world into dominant and nondominant carriers. Dominant
carriers could exert market power in such a way as to extract supracompetitive
profits and defeat entry by predatory pricing. 189 Creatively, the commission
determined that nondominant firms were those lacking market power.'90 To
determine dominance, the commission suggested that several factors were
relevant, but placed special emphasis on the existence of bottleneck control of
essential facilities. Under this definition of dominance, companies that leased lines
from dominant carriers for resale to end users, generally known as resellers, were
not dominant. The commission perceived that there were low barriers to entry and
exit and no ability to raise or lower prices from competitive levels by these

Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry),
2 F.C.C. Red. 3035 (1987).
18 Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, 4 F.C.C. Red. 1 (1989).
"8

"

Id. at 12.

The status of ONA and the Third Computer Inquiry is currently uncertain. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that the FCC failed to engage in reasoned decision making and overstepped
its authority in attempting to preempt state authority in ordering the implementation of ONA. California

v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
'" Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities, 91
F.C.C.2d 59 (1982). In succeeding decisions the commission detariffed other services as well. FCC
ANNUAL REPORT 45 (1984).

lu First Report and Order, Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services
and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980).
"9

Id. at 20-21.
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companies to justify its conclusion.19 '
Having found resellers nondominant, the FCC then felt it could lower the
degree of price and entry regulation in four areas. First, it eliminated the
requirement for cost information to support tariff filings of nondominant carriers
on the belief that the cost of filing outweighed the benefits to the customer.
Second, the commission shortened the notice periods for tariff changes to permit
quicker response to the market. Third, the commission revised the grounds for
suspending tariffs to prevent the use of the regulatory process to impede
competition. Fourth, it substantially revised the provisions for certification of
carriers and expansion of service and eased the means for abandoning service by
providing for a thirty day notice if other alternatives are available (which, by
definition, there must be if the service was competitive.)' 92
In subsequent orders, the FCC broadened the group of nondominant
carriers to include domestic satellite carriers, miscellaneous common carriers, and
domestic satellite resellers. 93 The commission also refocused the kind of
regulation that applied to nondominant carriers. In 1981, the commission
suggested two alternatives: forbearance and reclassification. 194 The first alternative would keep the carrier under FCC regulation but waive tariff filings and
authorizations for new service. The latter would have exempted nondominant
carriers from all regulation under Title II of the Communications Act. In 1982,
the FCC chose to apply forbearance.
In 1985, the commission attempted to take the final step by mandating
that nondominant carriers not file tariffs. 95 Many carriers, however, rejected
that approach. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the commission 96 The
court noted that the commission acted outside the constraints of the Communications Act, which required filed tariffs. 19 7 Despite this setback for the commission, much of the framework for deregulation was (now) in place for new
entrants.

'9' Id. at 29.

d. at 33-49.
Fourth Report, Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carier Services and
Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 92 F.C.C. 554 (1983).
1" Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (1981), affd, 91 F.C.C.2d 59
(1982).
'9

'"

1" Sixth Report, Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and
Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, rev'd sub nom., MCI Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186

(D.C. Cir. 1985).
'9 MCI Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
19 Id. at 1195, relying on 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982).

28

Darr: Telephone Services
Fall, 1990]

TELEPHONE SERVICES

At the same time that the commission was acting on the ComputerIII and
Common Carrier cases, it was moving in several other areas concerning
equipment and transmission. For example, the commission effectively detariffed
inside wiring from regulatory control,' 9" and sought to preempt state action
contrary to that order.1 99 The commission also investigated the need to deregulate the provision of shared tenant services, but chose not to preempt state
regulation. °°
While the FCC deregulated those markets it perceived were competitive,
it still faced access charges. In December 1982, it adopted an access charge plan
that sought to recover nontraffic sensitive costs (those that had been substantially
shifted to long distance tariffs through the separations process)20 ' through a
combination of flat fees on end users and carrier charges, based on usage.2t 2
(Until the rates became effective in January 1984, the commission continued to
use ENFIA negotiations to set access rates. 203) Political pressure forced the
commission to revise the plan by reducing the residential flat fees and extending
the transition period. 204 The companies responded by filing 43,000 pages of
tariffs and 160,000 pages of supporting materials on October 3, 1983.205 On
October 19, the commission responded by suspending the tariffs, further delaying
their introduction.2 °6 The most politically sensitive change was the customer fee
of one dollar per month, which was implemented in June 1985 and increased to
two dollars in 1986.207 At the same time these fees became effective, the
commission directed AT&T to lower its rates for message and WATS service.20 8 The FCC continued to put through additional rate reductions in subsequent years and proposed further increases in the residential flat fees for access
to the system. 2°9 The commission also ordered a three year phase-in of equal
access where switching equipment was available to further assist the transi-

Detariffing the Installation and Maintenance of Inside Wiring, Second Report and Order, 51 Fed. Reg.
8498, 59 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1143 (1986). The order detariffed the service effectively on January 1, 1987.
19 Detariffing the Installation and Maintenance of Inside Wiring, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1
F.C.C. Red. 1190, 1192-93 (1986), rev'd sub nom., National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC,
880 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
200 FCC ANNUAL REPORT 45 (1987).
196

201See supra text accompanying notes 102-07.
202

MTS and WATS Market Structure, 93 F.C.C.2d 241 (1983), modified, 737 F.2d 1095 (1985), affd,

737 F.2d 1103 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1224.
20 FCC ANNUAL REPORT 54 (1982).
204

MTS and WATS Market Structure, 97 F.C.C.2d 682 (1983).

2'5 FCC ANNUAL REPORT 46 (1983).
206id.

FCC ANNUAL REPORT 40 (1987).
20Id. Rates decreased 5.6% and 12% in 1985 and 1986, respectively.
20
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tion.210
The search for "real" costs, and the encouragement of new technology,
also directed the commission in its attempt to reset the allocation of nontraffic
sensitive costs (costs that do not vary with the amount of traffic such as the wire
connecting the user to the system) and customer premises equipment assigned to
interstate rates. The commission announced that its goal was to force cost based
rate making.21 The commission, however, recognized that the changes would
disrupt the economics of the higher cost local exchange companies that benefitted
from the former formulas. 12 This concern was magnified as the FCC sought to
increase the rate of depreciation of existing equipment to permit large writeoffs
as the regulated companies moved to install new technology.213
The change in regulatory philosophy also affected the FCC's approach to
price regulation of dominant carriers.214 It has attempted to use price caps as an

210

MTS and WATS Market Structure (Phase II), 100 F.C.C.2d 860 (1985).

211

FCC ANNUAL REPORT 49 (1982).

212FCC

ANNUAL REPORT 50 (1982).

Amendment of Part 31, 87 F.C.C.2d 916 (1981); Proceedings to Allocate Depreciation Reserve, 87
F.C.C.2d 1112 (1981). The alternative rates of depreciation presented increased costs of $1.1 billion
annually. FCC ANNUAL REPORT 48 (1983).
214 Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 54 Fed. Reg. 19,836 (May 8, 1989)
(hereinafter as FCC Price Cap). California has adopted a similar approach. Alternative Regulatory
Frameworks for Local Exchange Carriers, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 1 (1989) (hereinafter as California
Price Cap). In its plan, the California commission divided the services offered by Pacific Bell and GTE
California into three categories:
213

Category I services whose rates can be changed only with Commission approval
(basic monopoly services); Category ll services with downward pricing flexibility
(discretionary or partially competitive services); and Category III services which
have the maximum pricing flexibility allowed by law (enhanced services, Yellow
Page directory advertising services, inside wiring services, and any services found
in the future to be fully competitive).
Id. at 13. The California commission, decided that the Category 1 "partially competitive" services to which
it would grant downward pricing flexibility were current information access services, high speed special
access services, and billing and collection services. The price caps for a particular Category II service
will be set at the same level as the rates in effect when downward pricing flexibility for the service is
implemented. Price floors will be derived from "direct embedded costs." Id.
The Commission will set rates for Category I and III services by reference to an indexing
formula whose make-up is very similar to that of the PCI under the FCC plan. Like the PCI, the index
includes a component that takes account of inflation by using the Gross National Product Price Index
(GNP-PI). The GNP-PI factor is also reduced by a productivity adjustment However, this productivity
offset is four and a half percent, as opposed to three percent under the FCC plan. Finally, the index
further resembles the PCI in that it recognizes a "limited category of exogenous factors whose effects [on
costs] will not be reflected in the economy-wide GNP-PI", such as changes in tax laws that have a
disproportionate impact on local exchange carriers or changes in intraLATA toll pooling arrangements.
Id. at 14.
One major difference between the FCC and California commission plans is that the California
commission adopted a "sharing mechanism" which is "designed to provide protection to both ratepayers
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
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alternative to cost of service rate regulation of dominant or monopoly telecommunications service providers. The FCC expresses the belief that price cap regulation
will lead to greater efficiency and innovation on the part of the telephone
companies in question. It predicts that the anticipated productivity gains under
the new regime will benefit shareholders and ratepayers alike, and that price cap
regulation will lessen the administrative burdens associated with rate of return
regulation. The FCC also purports to provide solutions to the problems of crossIn short, the
subsidization between regulated and unregulated services.
for the telephone
commission has claimed to create a regulatory environment
2 15
companies that best approximates a competitive market.
2 16
The FCC plan divides AT&T capped services among three "baskets".
For each basket there is a price cap index, or "PCI". 217 Residential and small
business services comprise the first basket.2 18 AT&T will not enjoy the "streamlined treatment" afforded by price cap regulation if it raises or lowers the rates for
any service category in this basket by more than five percent annually, relative
to the change in the PCI.219 Furthermore, the FCC requires AT&T to compute
an "average residential rate" for the residential services within this basket. This
rate may not increase by more than one percent per year, relative to the changes
in the PCI, without AT&T losing the benefit of streamlined review. 220

The second basket is made up of all 800 services. The third contains all
other capped services, including WATS and private line services.22' Streamlined
treatment for these baskets is available if rate increases and decreases for each
service category in each basket do not exceed five percent per year relative to the
222
PCI.
The PCI on which the whole mix is based is essentially based on an

to keep the utility financially healthy." Id. Under this mechanism, if a local exchange carrier earns more
than a rate of return set 150 points higher than the expected market-based rate of return, the excess over

the benchmark rate of return will be split equally between ratepayers and shareholders. For 1990, the
California commission set the expected market based rate of return at eleven and a half percent, so the
benchmark rate of return is set at thirteen percent Furthermore, any earnings over a rate of return that
is 500 points above the market-based rate of return are returned solely to ratepayers.
25 FCC Price Cap, 54 Fed. Reg. 19,836 (1989).
216 For

a more complete description of the rate cap proposal, see Ghosh, The Future of FCC Dominant

CarrierRate Regulation: The PriceCaps Scheme, 41 FED. CoMM. LJ. 401 (1989).
217 FCC Price Cap, 54 Fed. Reg. 19,837 (1989).
218

id.

219

Id. AT&T. however, may not increase rates for domestic evening or night/weekend MTS service

categories by more than 4 percent annually after adjusting for the changes in the PCI. Id.

2 id.
221 id.
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inflation factor of the economy as a whole, and an offset for increased productivity for the telecommunications industry in particular. The PCI reflects the changes
in the costs of providing the services within a particular basket. 3 The inflation
component is set by reference to the Gross National Product Price Index (GNPPI), which is a "broad-based index of price changes in all sectors of the
economy. '22 From the inflation component the FCC subtracts a "productivity
offset" of three percent.2 5 The PCI also contains a component that measures
changes in certain "exogenous" costs, those costs which AT&T cannot control and
226
which affect the telecommunications industry rather than the entire economy.
Included in this component, among other things, are changes in access charges
that the carrier pays to local exchange companies, and possibly tax law changes
which have a disproportionate impact on the carrier.227 Price changes within a
basket are further limited by the "API", or actual price index. This index
measures the value of aggregate rates in a basket. Unless an "extraordinary
showing" is made, the API for a basket may not exceed its PCI.228 A further
restriction on price changes are "SBIs", or service band indexes. Services in each
basket are grouped into service categories, and the SBIs reflect rate changes
associated with these service categories."
The price cap rules required the FCC to set initial levels. The FCC
initiated the use of the price caps by setting the rates at levels effective at the end
of 1988.230 Once in place, rate changes could receive streamlined review on a
fourteen day notice of filing if the changes were within the limits previously
described. "In lieu of traditional cost support, streamlined filings need be
supported only by the calculations necessary to demonstrate that the proposed
rates are within the limits set by the PCI and the pricing limitations. 23 ' Rates
outside the bands would receive increased scrutiny and be subject to comment and
ninety days notice. 232 Rates exceeding the caps are subject to full-blown rate
review.233 Rates that were outside the bands are also subject to review, and must
be justified in terms of coverage of cost.234 New services that "add to the range
of options available to customers" are outside the price cap, but must be able to
mid.
2U Id.
225id.

m Id.
227 d.
2,id.
2" Id.
230Id. at 19,838.
23 Id.
232id.

233id.
234
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demonstrate an increase of net revenue to the company while restructured
services, or "rearrangements of existing services," are required to remain within
price cap rules. 2 "
To test the experiment, the FCC proposed to monitor the operation of the
price caps for four years, with a full review to begin after three years. 23 6 The
FCC also threatened earlier review if it did not appear that the experiment was
working satisfactorily.2 37 In any case, the price cap experiment was a major
policy change.
Because it remained under some form of price regulation, AT&T
continued to find itself with competitive problems in some markets that other
interexchange carriers hoped to skim off. Since 1987, AT&T has asked the FCC
to permit it to offer "company-specific" packages of services and rates. In April
1987, AT&T filed its first Tariff 12 package, designed especially for General
Electric. 238 The company subsequently sought to generalize the filing into a
tariff after substantial objections were filed to a company specific tariff.23 9 The
commission's Common Carrier Bureau approved the filing subject to the
installation of certain accounting safeguards. ° Contemporaneously, AT&T filed
voice and data tariffs specifically defined for DuPont, Ford, and American
Express.241 Again, the Common Carrier Bureau approved the packages. 4 2 The
FCC subsequently approved the use of specially designed tariffs, as long as the
packages would be made available to all similarly situated customers.24 3 In
addition to the company specific plans, AT&T also filed a discount program for
large customers that provided for five to ten percent discounts from its message
tariffs to meet competition." In contrast to the company specific plans,
however, the FCC may have indicated a tighter stance on case-by-case deregulation of the dominant carrier status of AT&T when it suspended the promotional
rate plan proposed by the company.

23' Id. at
2M

19,839.

id.

23 id.
2m, FCC ANNUAL REPORT 43 (1987).
2

n id.
24 Id. at 44.
2' FCC ANNUAL REPORT 41 (1988).
2

See, e.g., AT&T Communications Tariff No. 12 Rates and Regulations for Virtual Telecommunications
Network Service, 3 F.C.C. Rcd. 995 (1988).
AT&T Communications, Revisions to Tariff F.C.C. No. 12, 4 F.C.C. Rcd. 4932 (1989).
Z44FCC ANNUAL REPORT 41 (1988).

Carnevale, FCC Suspends Discount Package Offered by AT&T, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1990, at A9, col.
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In substance, the FCC appears to have sought to reduce its role in
regulating the telecommunications market by eliminating traditional regulation.
The thrust of the approach is that competition is a workable substitute in several
sectors of the business, despite the dominant position of AT&T. Certainly, in
detariffing the exchange carriers other than AT&T, detariffing inside wiring,
applying price caps to dominant carriers, as well as in its rhetoric, the commission
has sought to appear less intrusive. In other respects, however, it has created a
situation in which it must take much greater care of regulation. For those
regulated companies that operate in both competitive and noncompetitive markets,
the precision of regulation is heightened because of the concern over crosssubsidies and unfair competition. Thus, the irony of deregulation at the FCC is
that it requires much greater monitoring and has great attendant costs.
2. District Court Actions
Following its approval of the MFJ, the district court continued to closely
monitor the divestiture. It played a substantial role in defining the system of
districts that divided interexchange and intraexchange communications (termed
interLATA and intraLATA under the court approved plan),246 and in modifying
the plan of reorganization.247 Additionally, the court faced numerous requests
for waivers of the line of business restrictions by the local exchange companies.
In response, the court established procedures and requirements for handling
waivers.24 As a procedure, the court ordered the companies to direct waiver
requests to the Department of Justice, which made recommendations to the
court.24 9 Further, the court suggested several substantive safeguards to be part
of a waiver request, including the creation of a separate subsidiary, the separation
of financing, a ten percent limitation on diversification, and continued Justice
Department monitoring of the subsidiary. 250 Again, the court's concern about
the public interest appeared. In particular, the court stated that the waivers should
reflect the central purposes of the decree and a commitment to low cost reliable
251
service by the local exchange companies.
Some of the early waiver requests concerned problems that arose because
of shifting FCC regulation of related services. For example, the court granted a
waiver of the interexchange carriage prohibition to permit cellular telephone
operations.252 Similarly, the court permitted the continuation of weather and
246 United

States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 993-95 (D.D.C. 1983).

247United

States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C. 1983).

248United

States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846 (D.D.C. 1984).

249 Id.

at 873-74.

m5Id.12 at 870-72.
5'

Id. at 875.

Z52United States v. Western Elec. Co., 578 F. Supp. 643
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
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interexchange and information
time services, though a strict interpretation of the
253
services provisions would preclude such action.

Later requests addressed the expansion and diversification of local
exchange company activities. Following the court's direction to present waiver
requests to the Justice Department, the court approved requests that authorized

equipment leasing and sales, computer sales, entrance into nondomestic markets,

2
the creation of real estate subsidiaries, and investment in cellular systems.
The court continued to grant waivers in several other areas when the parties
demonstrated that the monopoly bottleneck did not pose a threat to competition.255 Nonetheless, waivers were a necessity even when no bottleneck was

apparent.256
Once the regional companies began to operate, and especially after the
first triennial review of the MFJ in 1987, some cracks began appearing in the wall
separating the monopoly and competitive areas. While the court maintained that
the monopoly position of the operating companies was essentially unchanged and
continued line of business restrictions on interexchange carriage, the court did
permit the companies to develop facilities to serve as information service
gateways and to enter into unrelated businesses.2 57 The court subsequently
concluded that the operating companies could engage in information transmission
(but not generation), voice storage and retrieval, and related equipment services.251 (On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals directed the district court
to reexamine its decision concerning information services in light of an alternative
standard that appears to be more favorable to the operating companies. 259 As
has been so often been the case with the divestiture, a great deal of uncertainty

United States v. Western Elec. Co., 578 F. Supp 658 (D.D.C. 1983). Likewise, the court permitted
some interexchange carriage that did not appear to present anticompetitive problems. United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 578 F. Supp 662 (D.D.C. 1983).
2m United States v. Western Elec. Co., 604 F. Supp. 256 (D.C.C. 1984).
2 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1986-1 Trade Cases 66,987 (D.D.C. 1986) (cellular radio);
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1987-1 Trade Cases 67,452 (D.D.C. 1987) (joint enterprise between
two holding companies to extend cellular service); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1987 Westlaw
4933 (D.D.C. 1987) (advertising); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1987 Westlaw 10109 (D.D.C. 1987)
(advertising); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1987 Westlaw 10108 (D.D.C. 1987) (advertising).
2m United States v. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. 1090 (D.D.C. 1986). See, e.g., United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 1986-2 Trade Cases 67,413 (D.D.C. 1986) (denying waiver for design and
development of switching equipment); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 675 F. Supp. 655 (D.D.C.
1987) (same).
2 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987), affd in part and rev'd in part,
900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
2' United States v. Western Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988).
The district court
2. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 309 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
subsequently concluded that it could not sustain the enhanced services restriction under the standard
"

promulgated by the court of appeals. Carnevale, Judge Opens Information Services to Bells, Wall St. J.,
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remains.) Once again, however, the district court was cognizant of the rate
implications of its decisions and considered it a critical factor in determining the
appropriateness of deregulation.2 °
The court thus took on two roles. On the one hand, it played the expected
role of servicing the MFJ. In that sense, the court attempted to balance the various
competitive interests of the parties and to determine how the philosophy of the
decree squared with particular requests for waivers. As the court became more
comfortable with the process and was better able to define the kinds of interests
it was attempting to protect, it permitted the operating companies the freedom to
enter unrelated businesses. In the area of related businesses, and especially those
which contradicted the philosophy of the MFJ, however, the court has retained a
relatively tight rein. Moreover, the court was likely to raise additional "public
policy" concerns, such as the consumer interest in maintaining low rates to
support universal service, in restricting the use of "bottleneck" facilities for
competitive services.
SumWmary
The division of regulation at the federal level, has therefore taken on a
curious nature. The agency assigned by Congress to make decisions in the public
interest, the FCC, takes the position that the market's competitive structure will
best serve the companies and their consumers. The court, on the other hand,
would appear to have a narrower frame of reference defined by the antitrust laws
(though augmented by a public interest review), yet has defined its powers to
review waivers of the line of business restrictions in such a way as to entertain
arguments that are central to traditional price and entry regulation. At the federal
level, at least, irony is in fashion.

THE OHIO REGULATORY STRuCTURE
As a result of changes in the structure and regulation of interstate
telecommunications, the states faced some difficult choices. Old forms of subsidy
that had proved so successful in mitigating local telephone rate increases were
unsettled. The rhetoric of the day, competition, further upset the existing
regulatory ethic. Unlike the open-ended federal scheme, however, the statutory
basis for action, particularly in Ohio, did not favor a flexible response. Yet, the
Ohio commission found ways to claim regulatory flexibility, maintain some of the
former subsidies, and even create some new ones with a rhetorical bow to
competition.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
2AoUnited States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp.

525, 585 (D.D.C. 1987).
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The Ohio Utility Compact
State regulation of telephone services prior to the adoption of House Bill
563 followed the general formula suggested by the "utility compact." 26' Each
element, franchising, service obligations, and rate approval, remains in the
statutory structure.
In Ohio, the regulation of utilities is governed by Title 49 of the Revised
Code.2 62 The PUCO is given the general authority to regulate utilities.263
Public utilities are defined to include telephone companies.2" An entity is a
telephone company "when engaged in the business of transmitting telephonic
messages to, from, through, or in this state and as such is a common carrier. 265
The commission's jurisdiction, however, extends to only property that is within
the state.26 Besides its general supervisory power,2 67 the commission is
directed to maintain public records,268 prescribe the form of records to be filed
by utilities,269 require utilities to file annual reports270 and any others the
commission may require,"' and direct the filing of contracts with the commission.? 72 For purposes of monitoring a utility, the commission273is empowered 27to
order maintenance of accounts concerning new construction, depreciation, 1

and a depreciation reserve.275

A telephone company's monopoly is defined by its ability to serve a
particular geographical area. In Ohio, the legislature has provided for unique
franchises for each local exchange company. 6 The franchises may not be
infringed by another phone company unless the commission finds that the existing
provider is giving inadequate service.27 7 The Code then requires that a public
261 See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
2Q

OHIO REV. CODE ANN., Tit. 49 (Anderson 1977 & Supp. 1990).

263

Id. § 4905.04 (Anderson 1977).

'"

Id. § 4905.02 (Anderson Supp. 1990).

20 Id. § 4905.03(A)(2).
-6 Id. § 4905.05.
2 Id. § 4905.06.
2" Id. § 4905.07 (Anderson 1977).
20 Id. § 4905.13.
210 Id. § 4905.14 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
21nId. § 4905.15 (Anderson 1977).
272 Id. § 4905.16.
27 Id. § 4905.17.
274 Id. § 4905.18.

Id. § 4905.19.
271 Id. § 4905.24.
277
Id. § 4905.241.
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utility "furnish necessary and adequate service and facilities '278 consistent with
the commission-defined service standards for telephone companies. 279 If there
is a service problem, the commission has several alternatives. Though the
commission may not order a merger, it may suggest that a merger take place to
solve a service problem and may order the transfer of a franchise if the merger
is not completed.2 80 Furthermore, residents within a franchise may petition for
a new provider if current service is inadequate. The commission may also order
an adjacent phone company to provide service if doing so would not prevent the
adjacent telephone company from earning a fair return. 281 If the commission
transfers the franchise under any of the conditions previously described, the prior
franchise holder must suspend service. 2 2 Each local company is therefore an
effectively protected monopoly, but cannot neglect customers and hope to retain
its service area.
Service is further protected by significant barriers to abandonment.
Section 4905.24 limits the right of a utility to abandon service to that approved
by the commission."' Section 4905.21 then provides that a utility seeking to
abandon a service must file an application with the commission, give notice to the
public of the application, and demonstrate at a hearing that the abandonment is
reasonable. 2 " Further, no service may be totally abandoned unless it has been
available for five years.28 5
Finally, the commission is given the authority to hear complaints
concerning individual practices or rates. Section 4905.26 permits complaints by
customers and the commission that rates or classifications are "unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, unjustly preferential, or in violation of law", or the
complaint of a utility "as to any matter affecting its own product or services. '2

While bound to serve all who request service within the geographic area,
the utility also receives the opportunity to earn fixed reasonable rates. Two sets
of statutes govern the rates charged by a utility. The first dictates those rates in
effect and prevents discrimination. Sections 4905.30 and 4905.31 require the

278 Id.

27

§ 4905.22.

Id. § 4905.231.
Id. § 4905.242.

23' Id. § 4905.243.
22 Id. § 4905.244.
23

Id. § 4905.20.

2"

Id. § 4905.21.

20

Id. § 4905.21.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
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utility to file its rates and special contracts with the commission.8 7 The utility
is then permitted to charge only those rates that are filed and cannot provide
refunds or rebates except as are generally available to other customers.8 8
Section 4905.31 eases the requirements of rate approval by providing for the
approval of special arrangements between a utility and customers. 8 9 Though
section 4905.31 permits special arrangements or contracts between a utility and
a customer, including variable rates, the arrangements must be supported by cost
or other evidence demonstrating that the arrangement is reasonable.290 Moreover, discriminatory rates, free service, or service for less than actual cost for the
purpose of destroying competition is prohibited.29 ' Section 4905.22 further
requires that all charges must be "just, reasonable, and not more than the charges
allowed by law or by order of the public utilities commission, and no unjust or
unreasonable charge shall be made or demanded for, or in connection with, any
292
service, or in excess of that allowed by law or by order of the commission."
The commission may change a rate that is unreasonable or unjustly discriminato93
ry.2
The other statutes provide for rate setting. The primary rate making
statute in Ohio is section 4909.15.294 In effect, the section directs the commission to determine a ratebase 295, a reasonable rate of return, 296 the fair value
of the return on rate base,297 and the cost of service. 298 The general revenue
of the company for a test year 99 is then the sum of the fair value of the return
on rate base plus the cost of service. 3' The commission is directed to order new

2

Id. §§ 4905.30 and 4905.31 (Anderson 1977 and Supp. 1990).

2=

id. § 4905.32 (Anderson 1977).

259Id. 4905.31.
290

Id. § 4905.31.

291Id.

§§

4905.33 and 4905.35.

§ 4905.22.
293Id., § 4909.26 (Anderson 1977). It is arguable that this section does not apply to all utilities since it
sets within a series of provisions dealing with the regulation of railroads, but the language is not specific
to the latter. See also, Townships of Mahoning County v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 58 Ohio St. 2d 40,
388 N.E.2d 739 (1979).
294Otuo REV. CODE AN. § 4909.15 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
293 Rate base is defined as the value of used and useful property, See Id. § 4909.05(E), an allowance for
working capital and an allowance for construction work in progress (limited by certain completion and
valuation ratios). Ida§ 4909.15(A)(1).
296Id. § 4909.15(A)(2).
297 Id. § 4909.15(A)(3) (essentially to multiply rate base by the rate of return).
298 Id. § 4909.15(A)(4).
299 Id. § 4909.15(C) provides that the test year on which rates are based may consist of six-months of
actual data and six months of estimated, but the commission may order that the test year consist of three
months of actual and nine months of estimated.
Published
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rates reflecting the revenue requirements established by the formula."'
The rate making statute, however, is not self-effecting. Sections
4909.18' and 4909.193o3 set out the procedures for approving rate changes.
34
Section 4909.18 provides that rate changes must be by written application.
If the change does not involve an increase in rates, the commission can order the
rate to be filed unless it determines that the rate is unreasonable.0 5 If the
change involves an increase in rates, however, the utility must file a property
valuation report, an operating statement for the prior fiscal year, an income
statement supporting the rate increase, a statement of financial condition, and a
proposed notice for publication." 6 Section 4909.19 then provides that the
commission begin a study of the proposed rate increase and directs the company
to publish the notice.3 7 After the commission issues a report of its study, the
company and other interested parties have thirty days to file objections. 0 If no
one objects, the report may go to a final hearing. ° If a party does object,
however, the commission is directed to set the application for an evidentiary
hearing at which the utility has the burden of establishing that its application is
reasonable.310 The commission will then enter an order setting the revenue
requirement and directing the utility to file rates that comply with the order. 1
The commission has several other general and remedial powers. It may
review the issuance of securities, and, in the case of domestic telephone
companies, may approve mergers.
It may order the correction of existing
violations of commission rules3 13 and order the improvement or repair of
facilities.31 4 It may also direct telephone companies to interconnect.315 Failure

30' id. § 4909.15(D). The commission is given discretion to set rates according to the cost of service but
is not required to do so. Id. § 4909.151 (Anderson 1977). The commission may make orders to improve
quality of service and consider management policies so as to disallow operation and maintenance expenses
it finds imprudent Id. §§ 4909.152 and 4909.154 (Anderson 1977 and Supp. 1990).
302 Id. § 4909.18 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
303Id.
314 Id.
3

§ 4909.19.
§ 4909.18.

Id. § 4909.18.

30

' Id. § 4909.18.
§ 4909.19.
3 Id. § 4909.19.
309Id. § 4909.19.
310 Id. § 4909.19.
301Id.

3" Id. The commission is also required to conduct local public meetings in some instances. Id. § 4903.083.
3

Id. §§ 4905.40-4905.49 (Anderson 1977 and Supp. 1990).

313 Id. § 4905.37 (Anderson 1977).
314 Id. § 4905.381.
315 Id. § 4905.50.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
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to comply with commission orders 316 may result in forfeitures of up to $1000
a day with each day constituting a separate violation and each violation being
cumulative. 317 The commission may direct the attorney general to bring an
action to collect the forfeitures3 18 or seek an injunction to prevent violations.319 Finally, the code authorizes some consumer 20 and criminal actions
for violations of commission requirements. 2'
Hearingsand JudicialReview
Hearings at the commission, whether related to rates or complaints, are
governed by their own procedural statutes. Section 4903.09322 requires that the
commission develop a record and issue a written opinion of its findings and
conclusions based on those findings. An internal appeal may be accomplished
through an application for rehearing.323 A further appeal may be taken directly
to the Ohio Supreme Court, which has sole jurisdiction to review decisions of the
commission .3' Review by the court, however, is limited to the record of the
commission and may be reversed only if the decision is unlawful or unreasonable. 25 Even if an appeal is filed, the commission's decision is generally
effective when the commission enters it, unless the appellant files successfully for
6
a stay.

32

Summary
The Ohio regulatory statutes in place prior to House Bill 563 created the
expected structure based on a natural monopoly theory. The commission parceled
out franchises for the provision of telephone service. While the company had to
provide a commission-directed level of service and could not abandon that service
except for good cause, the company was compensated by rate levels that entitled
it to the opportunity to earn a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the classic
utility compact was struck: monopoly service rights for regulated prices.

Id. § 4905.54 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
Id. §§ 4905.64 and 4905.54 (Anderson 1977 and Supp. 1990).
3" Id. § 4905.57 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
319 Id. § 4905.60 (Anderson 1977).
320 Id. § 4905.61 (treble damages for violation of commission order).
321 Id. §§ 4905.56 and 4905.99 (Anderson 1977 and Supp.
1990).
3,2 Id. § 4903.09 (Anderson 1977).
313 Id. § 4903.10.
32 Id. § 4903.12.
32 Id. § 4909.13.
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OHIO COMMISSION REACTION TO DEREGULATION

Introduction
In a sense, the PUCO has already faced many of the issues raised by
House Bill 563. Federal dissolution of the monopoly deeply affected Ohio and the
ability of the commission to retain universal service premised on low basic
exchange rates. The state faced the problem of addressing entry into what had
been single firm markets. Thus the same questions that faced federal regulators
as they began a service-by-service evaluation of sectors of the telecommunications
business also had to be addressed at the state level.
Faced with the dramatic changes caused by the divestiture order of Judge
Greene and the ongoing efforts of the FCC, the Ohio commission was forced into
a reactive posture. Like many other state commissions, the PUCO appeared very
concerned that the loss of support in terms of revenues, and the introduction of
competition, would limit its ability to regulate the local exchange companies.
Further, the commission feared the loss of smaller exchange companies serving
rural populations that had been subsidized by the statewide averaging process.
Taken together, it translated these concerns into several orders undertaken in
general proceedings that had the effect of retaining some of the support from long
distance toll that had existed under the prior separations process.32 7 Likewise,
the commission attempted to place limits and controls on competitive entry in the
form of certification and tariffing requirements.328 The commission carefully
circumscribed the ability of competitive services to dislodge local exchange
companies in the provision of the previously monopolized activities, such as the
provision of PBX services to ever-larger groups of unconnected users. 329 At the
same time, the commission attempted to move some previously tariffed items out
330
of the expenses for which customers were responsible, thereby lowering rates.
Other sources of business revenue, such as billing and collection services,331
were included in monopoly income. Given this predisposition to maintain the

327 On May 21, 1984, the Ohio commission responded to the need to set intrastate access charges in an

Opinion and Order. Opinion and Order, Establishment of Intrastate Access Charges, No. 83-464-TP-COI
(May 21, 1984) (hereinafter as Access Charges).
322 Opinion and Order, The Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications Services in Ohio, No.
84-944-TP-COI (Apr. 9, 1985) (hereinafter Regulatory Framework). Finding and Order, Regulatory
Framework for Competitive Telecommunications Services in Ohio (Phase UI), No. 86-1144-TP-COI (Aug.
2, 1988) (hereinafter Regulatory Framework (Phase MI)).
329 Resale and Sharing of Local Exchange Telephone Service, No. 85-1199-TP-COI (Aug. 19, 1986), affd
in part and modified in part, Entry on Rehearing, id., (Oct. 14, 1986) (hereinafter as Shared Tenant
Services).
33 Finding and Order, Detariffmg of the Installation and Maintenance of Simple and Complex Inside
Wire, No. 86-927-TP-COI, slip op., (Dec. 16, 1986) (hereinafter as Inside Wire).
33, Opinion and Order, Interexchange Billing and Collection, No. 86-2174-TP-COI, slip op. (Oct. 6, 1987)
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
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local monopolies and prior subsidies intact so as to maintain low local rates for
basic service, the recent retrenchment and substantial regulation associated with
alternative operator service,332 probably one of the most unlikely of monopoly
strongholds, should come as no surprise. In essence, the commission's early
efforts to respond to deregulation at the federal level represented a relatively
conservative effort to maintain the previous structure of rates and services.
Access Charges
One of the most telling actions on the part of the commission in its
attempt to maintain existing revenue levels was its access charge order. As the
commission recognized in its order, the goal of the proceeding was the creation
of cost based rates, but other concerns entered the picture as well.333 Among the
other concerns noted by the commission (and which seem to dominate the result)
3
was the maintenance of current revenue flows from interexchange traffic. 3
This interest tied in neatly with a disposition to guarantee universal service to the
extent possible. 335 Thus, in its first significant
action, the commission clearly
336
intended to maintain some sort of subsidy.
To guarantee prior levels of revenue, the commission provided two
mechanisms. First, the commission ordered intrastate tariffs for access to mirror
the FCC-set interstate rates. 337 In a break from direct rate setting, the commission concluded that the rates would change as the FCC approved new rates at the
interstate level.338 Second, the commission provided that each company would
be permitted to earn its 1983 levels of income from toll through access charges
and toll revenues. To achieve that result, the commission created a pool into
which each local company contributed amounts in excess of its 1983 requirement,
and drew out an amount to cover any shortage. 339 Any shortfall after the
payments to the pool would be made up by a "carriers presence charge", assessed
against the interexchange carriers.m° The net effect of these two provisions was
to place the revenue responsibility on interexchange carriers to make up any
shortfall in local exchange company revenues. In essence, legal forms for a
subsidy from long distance were retained.
332Finding and Order, Provision of Intrastate Interexchange Operator Assisted Services in Ohio, No.

88-560-TP-Coi, slip op. (July 18, 1989) (hereinafter as OSP).
33 Access Charges, supra note 327, slip op. at 2.
34Id. at

2.

'3 Id. at 3.
36 Id. at 3.
37 id. at 3.
3 Id. at 4.
33 Id. at 4-7.
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Subfiles A & B
The Access Charge docket remained open for several years as the
commission sought to administer and refine the process of setting these rates.
Initially, the commission created a docket called Subfile A for the treatment of
questions concerning the administration of access charge rates and the resulting
pool.Y' In Subfile A, the commission considered requests of the various local
exchange and interexchange companies, for revisions of the original access charge
order. Requests included modifications of the 1983 revenue cap, application
of the
2
access charges to specific carriers, and administration of the pool.3
The commission then initiated Subfile B to elicit comments on the
procedures for creating cost based access charges and the division of excess funds
held in the access charge pool. 4 3 In making modifications, the commission
noted that pooling had succeeded in maintaining the revenues of the local
exchange companies, while overall costs decreased as the federally set rates
declined and were mirrored into state access rates.' Without cost information
to set access rates, however, the commission took several half-measures. First, the
commission decided to phase out the pool process over the remainder of
1986.34 Second, the commission ordered the creation of a reserve fund for
coverage of any revenue shortfalls during 1986.3 Third, it eliminated the
carriers presence charge3l At this point, there was some movement toward cost
based rates.
The structural change, however, paled in light of a transfer of funds from
the pool to the local exchange companies. The commission directed a distribution
from the pool of excess funds that had been created because the amount of
revenue coming into the pool exceeded 1983 statewide revenue requirements.
Basing its decision exclusively on comments from the parties,? 8 the commission
ordered a division of the revenues based on relative contributions to the pool and
directed the local exchange companies to reduce their toll rates (rather than their
access charge tariffs) in an to attempt to prevent further pool excesses.3"

34' Establishment of Intrastate Access

Charges (Subfile A), No. 83-464-TP-COI (July 19, 1984)

(hereinafter as Subfile A).

m See, e.g., Subfile A, slip op. at 2-10 (Feb. 11, 1986).
Id. at 10.

30

3" Id.

at 11-12.
34 Id. at 12.
36 Id. at 12.
7 Id. at 12.
3" Id. at 13.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
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With the division of the pool, the local exchange companies received an
apparent bonus. Through the refund, the local exchange companies received extra
revenue above the 1983 residual requirements that the commission set in the
initial access charge proceeding. While technically not a rate increase, the effect
was the same. The commission subsequently denied an application for rehearing
challenging the commission's failure to hold hearings and its division of
the
351
350 and the Ohio Supreme Court sustained the commission's decision.
pool,

Subfile C
Subfile C continued the commission's quest to eliminate pooling and
return to more traditional company by company regulation. In an order dated
March 31, 1986, the commission created an industry task force of local exchange
companies to provide the commission with a plan for implementing cost based
access rates. 352 The local exchange companies' proposal, and others suggested
by consumers and interexchange companies, however, were rejected because the
commission found that they were not supported by cost information.3 53 In
particular, the commission noted that the local exchange proposal calling for the
maintenance of the mirroring of federal rates would result in an improper
subsidization of local exchange by interexchange carriers. 35 Further, interexchange companies noted that a continuing lack of cost information would permit
local exchange companies to mix costs for local monopoly service, and
competitive
intraexchange toll service, to the detriment of the competitive
5
carriers.

35

Without cost information, and admitting that the result would likely result
in some cross-subsidization, the commission nonetheless determined to cap
intrastate access charges at current interstate levels and to allow them to be
downwardly flexible.3 56 Second, the commission directed the elimination of
pooling of access charges. As a result, each company was responsible for its own
revenue requirement. 357 The commission, however, maintained a hardship fund
for small phone companies unable to meet their revenue requirements through the
end of 1986.358

s Entry on Rehearing, Subfile A, slip op. (March 31, 1986).
3 See infra text accompanying notes 466-71.
352Opinion and Order, Establishment of Intrastate Access Charges (Subfile C), No. 83-464-TP-COI, slip
op. at 3 (March 12, 1987) (hereinafter as Subf/de
3"
354
3
"

C).

Id. at 8.
Id. at 8.

Id. at 9.

356Id. at 10.

I3d. at 10.
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The commission also found itself with excess funds to distribute, and it
continued its prior course with a vengeance. It ordered a distribution exclusively
to the 9local exchange companies and a further reduction in local company toll
35
rates.
Finally, in one of the more remarkable provisions of its telephone orders,
the commission directed that companies could seek to raise access rates without
filing for a rate case as long as the rates sought were no higher than those in
effect in June 1984 and would result in the maintenance of the 1983 revenue
requirement.36 As the commission made explicit in its order, the "rate reduction
restoral" plan was to operate in place of a traditional rate case, pursuant to section
4909.18. 361 Again, the Ohio Supreme Court sustained the commission's
action.'
Competitive Services
1. Streamlined Rate Regulation (Phase I)
In the same time frame, the commission began to address the problem of
entry into traditional single firm portions of telecommunications, such as the
provision of long distance. In particular, it attempted to ease the regulatory
constraints on entry. 3 Unlike its federal counterpart, however, the commission
did not distinguish between dominant and nondominant firms. The commission
rejected an attempt on the part of the interexchange carriers other than AT&T to
impose additional restraints on dominant carners.3 Itconcluded, "[w]hile the
Commission is cognizant of the concerns expressed by some of the commenters
with respect to telecommunications providers with a dominant market share, it
believes that the forces of the marketplace, when coupled with the supervisory
oversight of this Commission, will ensure a fair competitive telecommunications
environment."' 5
Once again, however, the regulatory hand was much more apparent than
the invisible one. The commission required that all interexchange carriers have
a commission certificate to do business, though it reduced the content of the
filing.66 To prevent any increase in intrastate long distance rates, the commis35 Id. at 12-13.
360

Id. at 13-14.

3"

Id. at 15.

3a See infra text accompanying notes 472-75.
363 Regulatory Framework, supra note 328, slip op. at 3.

at 4.
30 Id. at 4.
3mid.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
3" Id. at 4.

46

Darr: Telephone Services
Fall, 1990]

TELEPHONE SERVICES

sion maintained tariffs for message toll service (MTS) and directed that these be
367
flexible downward from the then existing long distance tariffs of Ohio Bell.
The commission permitted discount rates only if the rates were available to all
customers within a designated exchange.368 Once the utility filed flexible tariffs,
it could raise or lower prices within the range of the tariffs without commission
approva1,36 but the commission required that utilities provide twenty days
notice of any change in rates.37 °
Unlike MTS rates, the commission banded the rates that could be charged
for other competitive services. The top rate could be no greater than two times
the minimum rate, unless the utility provided a special justification. 37' Despite
the banding, the commission did not require the company to provide a cost
justification for the tariffs. (However, the commission did note that it would
investigate tariffs that appeared to be unjust or unreasonable. 372 Presumably, the
commission would have given consideration to cost information if a particular
tariff were challenged.37 3) The commission approved the filing of tariffs
containing provisions for trial offerings of a product at a discount for up to thirty
days so as to attract new customers.374 If a utility wished to increase its MTS
or non-MTS rate above a ceiling, the commission required a ful rate hearing. 75
Despite the local exchange companies' control of access facilities, the
commission concluded that it would permit local exchange companies to file the
same kinds of tariffs for its MTS services that the interexchange carriers were
permitted to file.376 The current MTS tariff served as a ceiling for the flexible
tariff.377 Local exchange companies were also permitted to seek approval for
flexible tariffs for services other than MTS, but the commission required the
companies to demonstrate that the market for the service was sufficiently
competitive to justify the treatment.378 In contrast to the requirements on
interexchange carriers, the commission required that the minimum tariff be
supported by cost information "in order to insure that a local exchange carrier

id. at 5.
a Id. at 6.

3

36

' Id. at 6.
'70Id.at 6.
37 Id. at 6.
372Id. at

'3
74

6.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.

37 Id. at6.
6

Id. at 11.
37 Id. at 11.
3
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does not subsidize competitive offerings with its monopoly offerings. ''
ceiling was set at two times the floor.

79

The

The commission stretched its regulatory reach over new telecommunications entities as well. The commission concluded that interexchange resellers were
utilities subject to regulation 1 and held that the streamlined regulatory
approach would also be applied to radio common carriers and cellular radio
carriers. 31 The commission also found that "for-profit" use of the systems, or
other "shared tenant" arrangements, could be subject to commission regulation. 8 3 (It later determined that some STS services were not within commission
jurisdiction. 384) The private line services of gas and electric utilities, however,
were not subject to commission regulation since they were designed for private
uses.
2. Streamlined Rate Regulation (Phase II)
In 1987, the commission sought the comments of the utilities concerning
its streamlined regulation. Based on those comments, the commission continued
with some minor modifications the program it had established previously. 3 5 The
commission again refused to distinguish between dominant and nondominant
carriers.3 Several of the interexchange carriers likewise sought to impose
additional restraints on the local companies over the latters' competitive offerings.
The commission again refused to tighten the requirements. 8 7 Sensing that it was
constrained by statutes concerning certification, designation of service territories,
and abandonment, the commission also refused to limit the8 8filing requirements for
tracking companies subject to the public utility statutes.
The commission rejected any increase in the range of the banded tariffs.
Some commenters suggested ranges of up to 1000 percent, or complete detariffing
on the argument that the market place would limit prices to competitive
levels." 9 The commission rejected these requests on the ground that special

Id. at 12.
at 12.
381 Id. at 4.
382 Id. at 9-10.
39

3soId.

310id.

at 11.

3" See infra text accompanying notes 409-29.
3 Regulatory Framework (Phase II), supra note 328, slip op. at 1-2.
3w

Id. at 4.

8

Id. at 11-12.
3
Id. at 4-5.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
389 Id. at 6.
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relief was available, if it could be justified to the commission. 390 The commission, however, did agree to shorten the period for notice, reducing it to seven
days from twenty.3 9' Additionally, the commission permitted utilities to notify
customers of increases in the range either by a bill insert seven days prior to an
increase or by newspaper notice thirty days prior to an increase.392 Several
companies additionally sought to shorten the process for introducing new tariffs.
The commission, however, refused to shorten the review process in the belief that
393
it needed a sixty day period to study new filings.
The commission made two changes in the promotional tariff requirements.
First, it shortened the period of the effective date to ten days. Second, it extended
the time the promotion could run from thirty days to ninety.
The commission also noted some creative rate making that was occurring
through the complaint process provided by section 4905.26. Under this section,
the commission had approved special increases for services identified for specific
f"cost causers." The commission rationalized these cases on the belief that the
increases were necessary to avoid subsidization by other customers who were not
causing the increased costs. Nonetheless, the commission noted a general need to
seek legislation to open up rate-setting on a broader basis than the commission
felt it was permitted to do.3 94
The commission also addressed the problem of special contracts filed by
telephone companies on behalf of particular clients. It retained a ninety day
review process for special contracts filed pursuant to section 4905.31. Importantly,
however, the commission initiated a process for preapproval of contract forms that
could be used for future arrangements. "Once the terms and criterion for rates are
approved by the Commission, contractual arrangements falling within those
approved parameters [would] be allowed to take effect immediately upon their
95
filing with the Commission.0
Specific Services
Apart from the general regulatory framework and access charge questions,
the commission maintained that it would decide the competitiveness of particular

390Id. at 6.
39'id. at 7.
392Id. at 7.

393Id. at 8.
3" Id. at 10.

Published
39 Id. at by
13.IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991

49

Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 2
AKRON LAw REVIEW

[Vol. 24:2

service offerings on a case-by-case-basis. 396 Once again following the lead of
the FCC, the commission detariffed inside wiring. Two of the other generic
matters, shared tenant services and billing and collections, also offer some insights
into the commission's efforts to maintain the dual goals of supporting local
companies and depressing local exchange rates while adhering to the rhetoric of
competition.
1. Inside Wire
The decision of the Ohio commission to detariff inside wiring was
triggered by the earlier federal action.39 7 The FCC order required companies to
relinquish ownership of inside wire by January 1, 1987. In addition, the FCC
ordered companies to detariff the maintenance of wiring, although it permitted
them to continue to offer maintenance contracts for the service on a detariffed
basis.398

Also effective January 1, 1987, the Ohio commission ordered the transfer
of the beneficial ownership on inside wiring to customers. 99 This transfer
permitted customers to make any changes in the system they desired. 400 The
transfer of legal title was to be decided on a case-by-case basis until the phone
companies had fully amortized the cost of the wiring and abandoned it to the
users. 4° ' The companies were also permitted to sell any embedded wire (though
one might wonder how it could be identified separately from the federal portion
or the previously amortized state portion.) 402 The utilities were directed to notify
their customers of the impending transfer of ownership and responsibility for
maintenance prior to the transfer.4m The commission ordered that the portion
of the current tariffs associated with inside wiring be removed and that basic local
exchange rates be reduced by that amount.' The commission limited further
regulation of local loop wiring to the installation of external wiring and any
connection devices. Importantly, the local exchange companies were relieved 4of5
the responsibility of being the "provider of last resort" for maintenance services. 0

39 Entry on Rehearing, Regulatory Framework for Competitive Telecommunications Services in Ohio

(Phase 1I), No. 86-1144-TP-COI, slip op. at 7 (Sept. 20, 1988).
39 Inside Wire, supra note 330, slip op. at 6.
31 Id. at 3.
319 Id. at 6.
401 Id. at 6.
401 Id. at 6.
402 Id. at 6.

403 Id. at 8.
4
Id. at 5.
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To assist the customers in their new responsibility, the commission
directed the companies to make information available concerning the installation
and maintenance of wiring.40 Additionally, the commission directed the
companies to inform the commission of the companies' services on a detariffed
basis. 4w
In its entry on rehearing, the commission permitted a form of negative
enrollment for maintenance of inside wiring. To the extent that the service offered
by the utility did not increase the overall cost of local service, the commission
allowed the company to enroll the customer in its service plan without a positive
designation of interest. If the maintenance plan increased the cost of service,
however, the commission required a positive response from the customer for
enrollment."'
2. Shared Tenant Services
Shared tenant service (or STS) is "the third-party provision of telecommunicati9ns services to the occupants of multi-tenant buildings, complexes, or
developed properties through a private branch exchange (PBX)."'
The
commission stated that it wished to encourage the use of shared tenant services
for several reasons. First, it allowed greater aggregation of service, resulting in
lower individual costs. Second, it permitted lower usage charges through collected
long distance rates and the elimination of some local exchange costs. Third,
tenants could enjoy advanced calling features. Fourth, it gave smaller customers
the ability to use some other enhanced features, such as voice and electronic
mail.4 10 In its rietoric, therefore, the commission sought to achieve the promotion of technological innovation and economic efficiency.4 '
Consistent with this belief, the commission concluded that local resale and
sharing of shared tenant service were not subject to regulation. The seller was not
a telephone company because it did not hold itself out as a provider to the general
public.4 12 Local exchange companies were permitted to serve as resellers of
shared tenant services, but revenues would be treated as below the line in order
to avoid subsidies. In addition, the commission had to approve accounting

4

Id.at 8.

Id. at 8.
408Entry on Rehearing, Detariffing of the Installation and Maintenance of Simple and Complex Inside
4

Wire, No. 86-927-TP-COI, slip op. at 6, (Feb. 10, 1987).
409Shared Tenant Services, supra note 329, slip op. at 1.

4JOId.at 3.
411Id.at 5.
412Id.at by
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measures to assure separation of costs.4 1 3
Deregulation, however, did have its restrictions. As a means of protecting
the local exchange, the commission adopted several tariff restrictions on the
connection of shared tenant services to local exchange services. The purpose of
these restrictions was to prevent the creation of competing local exchange
companies which would siphon off revenues from the existing local exchange5
4
companies. 414 First, there was a requirement of geographic continuity.
Second, if more than one building was involved, "they must have a related
business purpose. '4,1 6 Third, the commission prohibited the interconnection of
different shared tenant systems.41 7 Fourth, participation was limited to occupants
of the buildings in the system4 s However, the commission refused a request
from the local exchange companies to partition tenants
from one another (i.e.
419
prohibition on inter-tenant calling on the system.)
Most telling were the tariff provisions for shared tenant system access to
the public network. In keeping with the commission's attempt to protect local
revenues, the commission permitted the local exchange companies to require a
shared tenant service to pay the local measured service tariff, despite the fact that
a PBX owner (a single business office, for example) could subscribe to a flat
rate. 420 The commission's rationale for this limitation was that the shared tenant
service was "functionally different in the sense that an STS firm is involved in the
business of providing telecommunications services to others rather than simply
meeting its own communications needs." 42 1The commission also feared the loss
of revenues that would occur as a result of the nontraffic-sensitive nature of a flat
rate. 422 Finally, the commission noted that costs should be assigned to the "cost
causers".423 Despite this rationale, the commission did acknowledge that the
operational characteristics of shared tenant service and a solely owned PBX were
identical. 4

413 Id.

at 7.

414

Id. at 10.

415

Id. at 11, modified in part, Entry on Rehearing, Shared Tenant Services, supra note 329, slip op. at

3.
416Id.
417
4s

419
42
421

422

id.
Entry of Rehearing, Shared Tenant Services, supra note 329, slip op. at 4.
Opinion and Order, Shared Tenant Services, supra note 329, slip op. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12.

Id. at 12.
4 Id. at 12.
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The commission also tied the hands of the STS service by requiring the
STS to pay the business cost of any additional directory listings for its customers.4 25 In its entry on rehearing, the commission recognized the potential error
of such an approach in the case of a residential system, and permitted the use of
STS notified the local exchange company of its
the lower residential rate if the
426
customers' residential status.
Another difficult issue presented to the commission was the continuing
requirement that the local exchange company provide a shared tenant service
customer with the back up service of a direct connection with the local exchange
company. 27 The commission concluded that the exchange company had a
continuing duty to provide direct service at the tenant's request. 428 Subscribers
were required to pay the same rates as ordinary customers for the same service,
even though it amounted to backup protection, and likely would present limited
additional variable cost on the system.429
3. Billing and Collection Services
Another attempt to protect old schemes of subsidy was the commission's
decision concerning billing and collection services. Billing and collection concerns
the contracting by local exchange carriers with long distance carriers for the
billing and collection for the latters' services. 30 With the exception of recording, the commission chose to deregulate billing and collections.431 It based its
conclusion to deregulate on two findings. First, the commission determined that
the service was no longer a utility function. Second, the commission discerned
that there was sufficient competition both within and outside of the telecommunications industry to prevent unreasonable practices. 43 2 Due to technical problems,
however, the commission required the local exchange companies to provide
recording services to all interexchange carriers until conversion to equal access
was completed. 33 Interestingly, the commission did not require that the
recording service be offered under tariff, though it did require that any income
received be treated as part of rate base related income. 4 3 Thus, a competitive

id. at 13.
Entry on Rehearing, Shared Tenant Services, supra note 329, slip op. at 4-5.
427 Opinion and Order, Shared Tenant Services, supra note 329, at 13.
421

42
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nonutility service was used to subsidize utility rates.435
The Retrenchment: Alternative OperatorServices
In several senses, the Ohio commission followed the lead of the FCC, and
essentially reacted. The reactive posture in itself suggested the general uneasiness
the commission felt with deregulation. Its implementation reinforced that
perception. Moreover, when faced with an unexpected new product and a large
number of consumer complaints, the commission fell back to direct regulation.
Alternative operator service provided the difficult test case.
The commission initiated the proceeding concerning alternative operator
services (AOS) as a result of informal complaints. These complaints identified
uncertificated interexchange carriers who were providing operator services at rates
substantially higher than the filed rates of other carriers.436 In general, alternative operator services amounted to the resale of WATS services to large
customers (such as hotels and hospitals) known as aggregators. "[T]he AOS
providers proposed to handle the interexchange calls placed from their customers'
437
establishments and then pay those customers commissions on the calls.,
The commission initially established several interim requirements on
AOS. First, rates were capped at the Ohio Bell tariffs for similar services. 438
Second, the AOS carriers were not permitted to surcharge customers for the
services. Third, operator- assisted calls through privately owned pay phones were
capped at the local exchange rate. Fourth, the AOS provider was required to
identify itself and quote its rates on request. Fifth, the AOS was required to
provide access, or information as to how to access other providers from the same
phone. Sixth, the AOS was to connect all emergency (911) calls directly to the
local exchange company operator. Seventh, the companies were required to file
an affidavit in which they agreed to comply with the requirements.439 Finally,
the commission reemphasized that each AOS was required to receive an
authorization certificate prior to commencing activity within the state.'

43 The commission required that billing name and address information be continued on a tariffed basis
since it believed that the local exchange companies had a bottleneck on this information. Id. at 8. Mixed
in with the competitive services of billing and collection was the provision of billing name and address
for random or non-presubscribed calls. This information was collected exclusively by the local exchange
companies and offered to the long distance carriers on a bundled basis with billing and collections. Under
the existing technological standards, only the local exchange companies could provide the information,
thus creating a technological bottleneck. Id. at 5-6.
"' OSP, supra note 332, slip op. at 2.
437id. at 2.
43

ld.at 3.

439Id. at 3-4.
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Following its initial order, the commission performed a study concerning
problems associated with the service. Based on the findings of the commission's
consumer affairs division, the commission found that AOS was not operating in
the public interest. As a result, the commission determined to set minimum
standards for all operator service providers."'1
In its second interim order, the commission had great difficulty in
defining what constituted alternative operator service. The commission finally
focused on the separation of the contracting party from the party responsible for
paying for the service. "The customers with whom the AOS providers contract are
host facilities, and the owners of those facilities do not actually pay for the
processing of the operator assisted calls. The actual end users of the AOS
providers' services are members of the transient public with whom the AOS
providers have not directly contracted to provide the services, but who actually
do pay for the processing of the calls. ''" 2 For those kinds of providers, the
PUCO implemented special regulation.
The commission identified four issues in its second order. First, the
commission looked at rates. It concluded that rates would be governed by the
provisions applicable to competitive long distance carriers. For interexchange
calls, this requirement limited rates to the Ohio Bell tariff levels." 3 Additionally, operator assisted rates were limited by the Bell operator rate ceilings. 4" Rate
changes within the cap must be filed with the commission seven days before they
were effective." 5 Additionally, the commission required each operator to
identify itself ("brand the call") prior to processing the call, and to post a notice
of the AOS provider on the telephone. 44 The notice must inform the user that
the rates could be different than those normally charged." 7
A second concern raised by the commission was the proper treatment of
911 calls. The commission directed the AOS carriers to completely avoid
intercepting and processing 911 calls." 8
Third, the commission established service and reporting criteria for the

44' Id.

at 44.

Id. at 43.
0 d. at 44.

42
4

Id. at 44-45 (the ceiling for customer dialed calling card calls was $1.70; for operator handled calls,
$2.50; and person to person calls. $4.80).

4"
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' Id. at 45.

46 Id. at 45.
447 ld.at 46, modified, Entry on Rehearing, Provision of Intrastate Interexchange Operator Assisted
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completion of calls. The companies were required to respond to ninety percent of
all calls within ten seconds of the appearance of the call to the operator." 9
Finally, the commission continued many of the prior interim standards.
First, it prohibited any surcharges other than those provided by tariff, such as
hotel or billing charges. Second, the commission prohibited backhauling charges
(payments for the cost of carrying the message on the precise route rather than
the air mileage between the connected points). Third, the commission required

instantaneous local operator connection by dialing

' 0
,0. 45

Each AOS was

request.415

required to quote its rates for services on
The commission again
required the AOS companies to permit access to other operators. Importantly, the
AOS companies were required to provide confidential lists of customers so that
the commission could proceed with service checks. 452
The AOS order is a curiosity if judged by the competitive nature of the
industry. If any part of the industry is competitive, it is the provision of resale
long distance service, which is essentially the heart of AOS. AOS companies are
essentially resellers with very low barriers to entry and exit. The curious
contractual relationships between the parties do not change the competitive
pressures the reseller faces from its customers, other AOS companies, and other
long distance carriers.4 53 Yet the commission devised elaborate notice and
tariffing provisions. This apparent reaction to a market failure which did not in
fact exist, and arguably could be rectified with time as customers became familiar
with the emerging service and took notice of the varying levels and costs of
service if they existed, suggested a fundamental distrust of the competitive model,
even at the competitive center.
Sumwary
The process of adjusting to divestiture and deregulation at the state level
did not suggest a strong correlation between theory and action on the part of the
Ohio commission. First, the efforts in Ohio have essentially been reactive to
federal actions. At the state level, the decision to establish access charges, the
changes in billing and collections, and inside wiring resulted from federal actions.
Second, the commission has protected the status of the monopoly local
exchange companies through several devices which sought to maintain revenues
at pre-divestiture levels. The most obvious of these is the access charge order, and
Id. at 46.
Id. at 48.
4-'
Id. at 48.
42 Id. at 48.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
45 See Darr, supra note 72.
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its guarantee of 1983 revenue levels through pooling and the carrier presence
charge. Likewise, the commission found methods to direct new revenues to the
local exchange companies with above-the-line treatment of revenue from
deregulated services and special rates, as in the case of shared tenant service.
Similarly, the commission has sought to prevent the costs of basic service from
increasing by driving costs through access charges, allocating competitive services
income to monopoly rate customers, and, as noted more fully below, through
depreciation schedules.' 5
Third, the commission has failed to make an independent factual
determination of the competitive nature of the telecommunications market.
Instead, it has relied on representations which have not been tested by empirical,
or even anecdotal, evidence other than through the process of notice and
comment.
Fourth, there may be a growing tendency in the commission to seek
regulatory responses to problems rather than to permit the market to adjust the
flow of information and the resulting prices. In particular, the commission's
decision concerning alternative operator services suggests it may be dissatisfied
with the market operation in one of the areas in which competitive forces at the
local level are most likely to work.
OHIO JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO DEREGULATION
The problems noted above suggest that the commission's decisions might
face significant challenges if appealed. Both substantive and procedural flaws are
evident, and a significant forum exists in which to challenge the commission's
action. Under Ohio law, the Ohio Supreme Court must hear appeals from
decisions of the PUCO.455 However, this judicial check on the commission's
actions has been limited. Though the court routinely notes that the commission
is a creature of statute and lacks any authority to take action not permitted by the
enabling provisions of Chapter 49 of the Ohio Revised Code, the court also has
recognized that the commission has broad authority to "interpret" the operative
provisions of the chapter. The commission has taken full advantage of that
authority. Moreover, the court has conceded that the federal actions resulting in
deregulation of interstate transactions have required that the commission adopt
novel approaches which do not fit cleanly within the legislative structure for
determining rates and other matters.
However, a curious irony exists. Under the guise of deregulation, the
commission has justified to the court several actions which generally assist the
4- See infra text accompanying notes 507-09.

Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991322-26.
4" See supra
text accompanying notes

57

Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 2
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:2

local exchange companies in maintaining current revenues and their monopoly
status. Thus, the banner of deregulation has justified some results which reinforce
traditional monopoly rights of the local exchange companies, and has frustrated,
at least theoretically, the introduction of competition into the Ohio telecommunications market.
Standard of Review
Part of the court's deference is explained by the statutory standard of
review. Though the Revised Code requires appellate review of all cases for which
appeal is sought, the standard of review is nonetheless limited. It provides that the
decision of the commission will be upheld unless it is "unlawful or unreasonable. 456 On issues of fact, the court has taken a highly deferential position. The
court "will not reverse or modify a PUCO decision as to questions of fact where
the record contains sufficient probative evidence to show that the PUCO's
determination is not manifestly against the weight of the evidence and is not so
clearly unsupported by the record as to show misapprehension, mistake, or willful
disregard of duty."457 This standard, however, cannot explain the court's
deference on matters involving the application and interpretation of statutory
authority by the commission. In this area, the court claims to have retained the
authority for complete and independent review.4 58
Nonetheless, the court has deferred to the commission's expertise to
interpret what the legislature intended, even in instances in which a matter of
statutory review is controlling. In a telephone rate case, for example, the
commission defined the term "working capital" as contained in the rate base of
a utility in such a way as to prohibit the offset of rate base when the commission's calculations demonstrated that income from rate payers exceeded any
requirements from investors. 459 That is, customers' payments covered the
company's working capital requirements, which normally are contributed by
investors' funds. However, the commission did not reduce the ratebase to reflect
that amount. In affirming the commission's decision, the court once again
deferred to the commission on a matter of statutory interpretation. 460 According
4

5 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4903.13 (Anderson 1977) provides, in part: "A final order made by the public
utilities commission shall be reversed, vacated, or modified by the supreme court on appeal, if, upon
consideration of the record, such court is of the opinion that such order was unlawful or unreasonable."
457 MCI Telecom. Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 38 Ohio St 3d 266, 268, 527 N.E.2d 777, 780
(1988), reh'g denied, 39 Ohio St. 3d 710, 534 N.E.2d 93 (1988). See also Dayton Power & Light Co. v.
Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 4 Ohio St.3d 91, 447 N.E.2d 733 (1983); Columbus v. Pub. Util. Comm'n
of Ohio, 58 Ohio St. 2d 103, 388 N.E.2d 1237 (1979).
4-"MCI Telecom. Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 38 Ohio St. 3d 266, 268, 527 N.E.2d 777, 780
(1988), reh'g denied, 39 Ohio St. 3d 710, 534 N.E.2d 93 (1988).
'" Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 32.Ohio St. 3d 263, 266, 513 N.E.2d

243, 247 (1987).
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to the court, the absence of a specific definition within a controlling statute
indicated that "the General Assembly has vested the PUCO with broad discretion.""46 The effect of these kinds of decisions is to place a great deal of power
in the hands of the commission.
Judicial Treatment of Telecommunications Cases
In this regard, the court conceded to the commission a greater role in
defining the state's telecommunications policy prior to legislative changes found
in House Bill 563. Though the sample of cases is small because most commission
cases are not appealed, those that are available present a telling pattern. The Ohio
Supreme Court has reviewed several cases concerning access charges, complaints
as to tariffs, and rate cases involving mixed problems of regulated and deregulated services. In these cases, the court accepted the commission's general approach
of maintaining local monopolies, even while the court couched its acceptance in
terms of the deregulation and despite statutory limitations which often directed
different results.
1. Access Charges and Pooling: The Generic Cases
As noted above, 2 the commission approved a set of procedures for
implementing access charges which locked in local exchange company revenues
at 1983 levels. Following the initial order, the commission continued to face
questions concerning the distribution of the pool of funds exceeding the revenue
requirements." 3 In two subsequent decisions, known as Subfiles A and B and
Subfile C, the commission ordered the distribution of the excess funds.4" MCI
appealed each of these decisions.465
The dispersion of the pooled funds collected under the access charge
order presented the court with another opportunity to affirm the commission's
"broad brush" approach to regulating telecommunications after the divestiture. In
the first MCI case arising from the commission's Subfile A and B decision, MCI
challenged the pro rata distribution of the pool excess on the grounds that the
466
commission failed to provide due process and ordered discriminatory rates.
In affirming the commission, the court rejected MCI's due process claim and

4

Id. at 265, 513 N.E.2d at 246.

46

See supra text accompanying notes 337-40.

46' See

supra text accompanying notes 341-62.

w Id.
MCI Telecom. Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 32 Ohio St. 3d 306, 513 N.E.2d 337 (1987)
(hereinafter as MCI I); MCI Telecom. Corp. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 38 Ohio St. 3d 266, 527
40

N.E.2d 777 (1988) (hereinafter as MC 11).
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IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1991N.E.2d
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upheld the commission's authority to alter rates and direct refunds through a
notice and comment procedure. Despite a statutory complaint process and the
requirements the rate making statutes impose on hearings, the court rejected the
company's demand for a hearing on the theory that "ratepayers" had no
constitutional right to a hearing absent a concomitant statutory righLo The
court further held that the use of notice and comment satisfied a statutory
requirement that the decisions of the commission be supported by evidence of
3
record." s
Second, the court concluded that the rate reduction did not present a case
for the application of the antidiscrimination statutes." 9 In addressing this
argument, the court accepted the finding that the source of funds contained in the
pool was not limited to the interexchange carriers, thus eliminating the possibility
that the rate reduction resulted in a form of cross- subsidy which unfairly allowed
the local exchange companies to use competitors' funds to lower their rates for
competing long distance service.47 The court could thus conclude that the
commission had acted properly within its broad discretion in7 allowing the refund
to be passed through in the form of the toll rate reduction '
In MCI I, the court completed the reasoning it began in the prior case.
Again MCI challenged the procedures for setting access charges and the
distribution of funds that had accumulated in the access charge pool.

72

In

affirming the commission's decision, the court relied on its prior opinion, and
found that the commission's broad discretion permitted it to enter into "a generic
rate-making process" through notice and comment.47 3 The court also found that
the requirement that a decision be on the record was satisfied by the commission's review of its own prior decisions, and its assertion that sufficient companyspecific cost information was not available to set access charges for individual
companies. 47 Finally, the court failed to address in any further detail the
allegations that the rate reductions would result in discrimination against the
interexchange carriers. 475

46

Id. at 310, 513 N.E.2d at 342. See OIuo REV. CODE §§ 4905.26 and 4909.19 (Anderson 1977 and

Supp. 1990).
40 MCII1 32 Ohio St 3d at 311-12, 513 N.F.2d at 343.
4e See supra text accompanying notes 290-93.
470 MCI , 32 Ohio St 3d at 313, 513 N.E.2d at 344-45.
47 Id. 513 N.E.2d at 345.
47 MCI II, 38 Ohio St. 3d at 268, 527 N.E.2d at 779.
47 Id. at 270, 527 N.E.2d at 781.
47 Id. 527 N.E.2d at 781.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
47 Id. at 272, 527 N.E.2d at 782.
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2. Access Charges: Complaint Proceedings
As an alternative to directly attacking the commission on its orders setting
up particular procedures, other parties sought to attack the commission's policy
(and more directly, local exchange practices adopted pursuant to those policies)
through the complaint process provided by section 4905.26.476 The results of
these cases have been mixed at best.
One of the early challenges to the mirroring of access rates through a
complaint case appears in the 1987 Allnet case (Allnet 1). 477 As a result of the
mirroring requirement, Ohio Bell raised its state access tariffs to the federally-approved levels.478 Allnet complained to the commission that the increase violated
the statutory requirement of a full rate case for a rate increase.479 The commission dismissed the complaint on the ground that it amounted to an untimely
attempt to rehear the original generic case setting access charges. 480 In reversing
the commission, the Ohio Supreme Court found that Allnet had stated sufficient
grounds for a complaint under section 4905.26.481 In particular, the court was
concerned that Allnet have an opportunity to present its claim that the increases
authorized by the mirroring order were unreasonably large. 48 Moreover, the
commission had indicated its intent to monitor access charges and adjust them if
necessary to prevent unreasonable rates in its original access charge order.48 3 As
a result, the court concluded that the commission should perform the review
that
4 s4
it said it would perform when it established the mirroring requirements.
In Allnet jj,415 the commission again dismissed a complaint challenging
the Ohio Bell access tariffs for intraLATA access, and the Ohio Supreme Court
reversed. Following its decision in Allnet I, the court concluded that the appellant
had stated sufficient grounds under section 4905.26 by alleging that it was paying
premium access rates for less than premium service. 4 6 Again, the commission
probably assisted the court in its decision by stating that it recognized that there
was a problem, but would delay the resolution of it until it could hold a generic

4" See supra text accompanying note 286.
4
7 Alnet Comm. Serv., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 32 Ohio St. 3d 115, 512 N.E.2d 350 (1987).
41 Id. at 115, 512 N.E.2d at 351.
47 Id. at 115-16, 512 N.E.2d at 351.
40

Id. at 116, 512 N. E.2d at 351.

Id. at 117, 512 N.E.2d at 352.
Id. at 117, 512 N.E.2d at 353.
4 Id. at 117-18, 512 N.F-2d at 353.
4" id. at 118, 512 N.E.2d at 353.
483 AUnet Comm. Serv.. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 38 Ohio St. 3d 195, 527 N.E.2d 840 (1988).
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hearing concerning the matter.4 '
The effect of these decisions is substantially more than might be
suggested by the narrow legal lines the decision sought to draw. The court has
repeatedly stated that the complaint process is not available to competitors to
challenge utility ras.488 In stark contrast to the decisions based on the discrimination statutes in which the court refused to address the competitive questions
raised by the complaints, the court in Allnet I and I permitted a downstream
competitor to challenge a rate for its reasonableness without meeting the narrow
requirements found in sections 4905.33 or 4905.35. In essence, the court opened
a new avenue for competitors to shore up their competitive position.
Justice Douglas' dissent in Allnet II suggests the problem with the court's
approach to the complaint process in the access charge area. In essence, the
distinction between competitors and customers is blurred. Despite specific
provisions concerning anticompetitive behavior contained in the code, "customers"
of access could now use section 4905.26 to sidestep the narrow constraints. Thus,
thereby
the customer could seek a competitive advantage through this procedure,
48 9
arbitrator.
competitive
of
role
the
into
casting the commission
A second, thornier, issue presented by the Allnet cases is the curious
contrast between those cases and the MCI decisions. On the one hand, the court
permitted the commission to set rates through a generic proceeding. On the other,
it directed the commission to hold detailed hearings if a challenge is presented.
In the latter, the challenger carries the burden of demonstrating that the rates are
unreasonable. Yet the utility is never required to demonstrate that the rates are
initially reasonable. Thus, a complete shift of responsibilities occurs. In essence,
the customer is required to demonstrate what reasonable rates are for that utility.
That result is hardly indicated by the rate making statutes.
3. Rate Cases

The third potential avenue remaining for stake holders wanting to address
the competitive policies of the commission is the traditional rate case. Once again,
however, the court has demonstrated a remarkable ability to treat the competitive
issues in a way which permits the commission to perpetuate the hold of the local
exchange company over potential competitors, while arguing competitive
necessity.

4V

id.

4u

See, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 69 Ohio St. 2d 401, 433 N.E.2d 923 (1982).

4 Allnet Comm. Serv., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 38
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
(Douglas, ., dissenting).

Ohio St. 3d at 197-98, 527 N.E.2d at 843
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In Armco, 490 the commission's first attempt to argue competitive
necessity for unusual forms of rate regulation was successful. In this case, the
commission approved an Ohio Bell request for flexible rate schedules for the
provision of some of its business equipment systems.4 9' The commission based
its approval of the rates on the increased competition in the market and the
inability of Ohio Bell to respond to that competition under fixed rate schedules.49 Importantly, the commission's decision came on the heels of the FCC's
approval of detariffing customer equipment in the Computer IHinquiry 3 The
rate schedule set a minimum rate and permitted increases up to two times the
minimum rate. 494 Despite the failure to set a single rate, the court noted that the
minimum rates were set under normal ratemaking procedures so as to provide a
return to the utility.495 The court did not indicate how the costing of the service

occurred.
A customer and a group of competitors challenged the commission's
approval.4 96 The first challenge to the rates asserted that increases permitted
under the flexible tariffs were not permitted under the provisions for rate changes
contained in the Revised Code.49 7 Second, the appellants argued that the
commission lacked the authority to approve flexible rates.498 Addressing the first
two challenges, the court agreed with the commission that section 4905.31,
concerning special arrangements for utility service, permitted the commission to
approve a flexible schedule. 99 The court seemed greatly influenced by the
ongoing efforts in the divestiture case, and by the FCC, to accomplish some of
the competitive goals contained in the challenged order.5°° These changes at the
federal level necessitated a different approach to regulation at the state level.5 '
As the court concluded, "[wihat is clear is that the radical transformation of the
formerly monopolistic, regulated telecommunications market is proceeding apace
and that this transformation is of such magnitude as to require a thorough
reexamination of these regulatory practices and procedures which have become
inapplicable or obsolescent in the face of non-monopolistic market condi-

490Armco, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 69 Ohio St. 2d 401, 433 N.E.2d 923 (1982).

491Id. at 401, 433 N.E.2d at 924.
491Id. at 402, 433 N.E.2d at 924.
491Id. at 402-03, 433 N.E.2d at 925.
49 Id. at 403, 433 N.E.2d at 925.
4
9 Id.
49 Id. at 404, 433 N.E.2d 925.
49 Id. at 405-07, 433 N.E.2d at 926-27.
4" Id. at 407, 433 N.E.2d at 927.
4

"9
Id. at 409, 433 N.E.2d at 928.
-'Id. at 409-10, 433 N.E.2d at 928-29.
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tions. " -' 2
Several equipment vendors that competed against the Bell companies also
complained of the strategy adopted by Bell to encourage its customers to move
to new equipment on long term contracts. 3 They alleged that Bell had adopted
rates on new and old equipment which encouraged customers to sign long term
contracts which precluded competition. 5°' However, the narrowness of the
applicable statute concerning discrimination, section 4905.33, prevented the
commission from entering the fray, because there was no evidence that the
company was offering the new services for free or below "actual cost."505 The
court approved the commission's view that it was "without jurisdiction to
entertain allegations of anti-competitive practices unless the statutory conditions ... obtain. ' 5°6

Once again, the effect of the decision was to permit the regulated
monopoly an opportunity to compete on a better playing field. It could provide
competitive services from within the structure of a protected monopoly and its
practices could not be challenged as being anticompetitive within the regulatory
framework.
In an apparent departure from the favorable treatment of the local
exchange companies, the commission refused to adopt accelerated depreciation
schedules after the FCC attempted to preempt state regulation in a CincinnatiBell
case." The Ohio Supreme Court agreed, and held that the FCC action did not
estop the commission from making a different finding, despite the commission's
participation in the FCC docket. 50 8 The court went on to reject Bell's argument
that the FCC order preempted the state from setting different depreciation rates
than those prescribed for interstate rates by the FCC. The court concluded that the
FCC lacked the authority to prescribe intrastate depreciation rates, even under the
FCC's assertion that the approach was necessary to promote the interstate
system.5 Again, however, the slower depreciation schedules had the effect of
slowing competitive pressures. Ironically, this time the effect potentially favored

502 Id.

s'3 Id. at 412, 433 N.E.2d at 929-30.
'" Id., 433 N.E.2d at 930.
305

Id.

506 Id. at 412-13, 433 N.E.2d at 930.

Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 12 Ohio St. 3d 280, 466 N.E.2d 848 (1984),
appeal dismissed, 476 U.S. 1166 (1986). The commission's authority to set intrastate depreciation
schedules was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355
(1986).
3'6 Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 283, 466 N.E.2d at 852.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
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the local exchange companies because their rates would appear more competitive
than the effect of the obsolescence of their equipment might actually permit. In
other words, the local exchange companies' rates were being maintained at
artificially low levels compared to unregulated entities, which could more
accurately write off the cost of plant for economic depreciation. In the short run,
at least, the local exchange companies benefited from lower perceived costs due
to the commission's action and the court's approval. Once the customer was
drawn into the Bell system by its lower rates, he had an additional incentive to
stay, even if the rates were later increased, as the real depreciation costs were
recognized.
Summary
There is a certain irony in the court's growing deference to commission
actions in telecommunications regulation. The state goal of adapting to the
competitive environment created by divestiture is dramatically different from the
effect of the decisions issued by the commission and approved by the court.
Indeed, the effect of the decisions is to strengthen the competitive position of the
local exchange companies in their relations to potential competitors. Thus, the
competitors of the local exchange companies could be financing the lower rates
of their competitors in the intraexchange long distance market.
This problem was partially mitigated by the court's apparent approval of
the complaint process by competitors seeking to lower access tariffs. However,
the irony is further reinforced by requiring the competitors to demonstrate that the
tariffs are unreasonable under the standards of section 4905.26. Thus, the burden
of ascertaining the appropriate cost information is placed on the wrong party: the
one with the greatest competitive pressure to keep costs low and avoid additional
administrative wrangling and the expenses associated with it.
A second and even more fundamental effect of the court's decisions is the
continuing deterioration of the legislative rein over the PUCO. While the General
Assembly has apparently endorsed much of the commission's agenda with the
adoption of House Bill 563,51 ° the court's acquiescence is still more remarkable
in light of the statutory standards it has claimed to apply. 1' Quite simply, there
was nothing in Chapter 49 which would permit the court to endorse "generic rate
making", as it did in MCI 1H. Very specific procedures are set out in the code for
setting rates through the determination of the costs of providing service.

10See

infra text accompanying notes 517-76.

31See supra text accompanying notes 456-61.

-512 See supra
text accompanying notes
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While the rates for a particular service need not be based purely on cost,5 13 the
overall revenue of the utility is limited by a very specific formula. To approach
an industry as if it were a single company to set "generic rates" does not meet the
requirements of the statute.
Third, the court permitted the commission to substitute notice and
comment proceedings for actual factual hearings. In some cases involving policy
making this may make sense. There is also a recognition that some form of rate
making can occur through notice and comment without offending notions of due
process.5 14 However, the commission, with the court's approval, has taken this
procedure to new levels. Inherently, the powers of the commission then moved
beyond those of an agency entrusted with certain powers to one with its own set
of predilections that could be exercised at will.
OHIO'S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO DEREGULATION

Despite its success in administratively redefining its legal authority, the
Ohio commission, in its second Regulatory Framework decision, recognized the
potential limits of the existing statutes in its decisions concerning deregulation. 5 (Thus a weak argument can be made that the decisions of the commission reflected the statutory limitations.) One might also point to the court's
approval to question the need for additional authority when it acceded to nearly
all of the commission's assertions of authority to set rates in novel and apparently
extra-statutory ways. 516 Nonetheless, the Ohio legislature moved forward on a
much broader agenda to offer telephone companies a new regulatory environment.
House Bill 563 served as the conduit for that change.
Legislative History of House Bill 563
As introduced, House Bill 563517 was a curious laundry list of provisions. Its primary provisions suggested a general goal of deregulation. 5 8 The

-"' Townships of Mahoning County v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 58 Ohio St. 2d 40, 388 N.E.2d 739

(1979).
54 United States v. Florida East Coast Rwy. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 235 (1973).
-I- Regulatory Framework, supra note 328, at 4.
516 See supra text accompanying notes 472-75.
-'"

Ohio H.B. 563, 117th General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1987).

5s In an interesting departure from traditional Ohio practice, the bill contained a statement of legislative
purpose. Id. § 4927.02. The proposed findings suggested that current regulation was inappropriate and that
future universal service required continued reasonable charges. Id. § 4927.02(A)(2)-(3). The bill then

declared the policy of the state to be the encouragement of innovation in telecommunications, the
promotion of diversity, the maintenance of reasonable rates for basic local exchange service, to both
maintain regulation and detariff, and to establish Lifeline rates. Id. § 4927.02(B). The General Assembly
retained much of this language in the final enacted version of the bill. See infra text accompanying notes
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
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major goals of the bill were a provision concerning reduced barriers to entry5 19
and a provision for price caps which would permit increases for local service rates
based on increases in the Consumer Price Index. 52" The bill also provided for
automatic rate reductions,52 and it partially modified the standards for the
introduction of new services. Finally, it expanded the complaint
process to
5 22
recognize claims by parties seeking access to the local exchange.
On the other hand, the bill retained many traditional features of regulation
and monopoly rights. Most significantly, the local exchange companies kept their
sole franchises. 523 Additionally, the utilities retained the power to exercise
eminent domain and their exemption from zoning requirements.52 The bill
contained numerous reporting requirements as well.525 It also retained requirements for abandonment and for the establishment
of services.526 Finally, the bill
527
rates.
lifeline
some
mandated the provision of
Early committee testimony on the bill was essentially supportive of the
need for change. Industry spokesmen such as the presidents of the major Ohio
telephone companies stressed the need to recognize increased competition in the
form of cellular, private microwave, and two-way cable that existed. 528 There
was less agreement over the effect of the bill and its pricing provisions on the
cost of telephone service. Ohio Bell's president suggested that it provided a
means of protecting local customer subsidies. 529 However, United Telephone's
president stated that the competitive market would force out subsidies and rate
averaging which had existed under monopoly regulation.53
The commission's early position was not specific. The commission felt
it appropriate to allow market forces to operate, and noted the generic proceedings
it had undertaken to accomplish this on a limited basis.5 3 ' The commission also

-"9Ohio H.B. 563, § 4927.03 (as introduced).
-"2

Id. § 4927.04.
4927.04(E).

521 Id. §

" Id. § 4927.07(B).
5 3 Id. § 4927.09(B).

s2 Id. § 4927.09(A).
Id. §§ 4927.06 (annual reports) and 4927.08 (triennial review by the Public Utilities Commission to
the legislature and governor).
52

326

Id. §§ 4927.05 and 4927.07(A).

527

Id. § 4927.10.
Testimony of Edward Bell, President of Ohio Bell Telephone Co. (Sept. 29, 1987) at 7; Testimony of

32,

L Darrell Kelly, President of United Telephone Co. of Ohio (Sept 9, 1987) at 7.
329

Testimony of Edward Bell, supra note 528, at 4.

s30 Testimony of J. Darrell Kelly, supra note 528, at 10-11.
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took the position that regulatory flexibility should be encouraged.532 Nonetheless, the commission remained neutral on the original version of H.B. 563.
On the other hand, the Office of Consumers' Counsel took an early
position setting out its opposition to the bill.M In particular, the Consumers'
Counsel felt that the claims concerning competition and consumer desire for
varied services were overstated.5 35 The testimony also contained a strong
endorsement of rate regulation, as then required by the Revised Code and
implemented by the commission, and warned of increased rates if greater freedom
were given to the companies to set them.536
Following initial hearings in September and October 1987, the bill stalled
for more than a year. The delay was caused in part by disagreement among the
local exchange companies over the use of a pice cap approach to setting
rates.537 The local companies were further split on the need to proceed with full
rate cases to implement a new rate structure.13 During the delay, extensive
negotiations apparently took place to revise the bill to meet commission,
53 9
Consumers' Counsel, and industry concerns.
On October 14, 1988, the chairman of the Public Utilities Commission
provided a substitute bill to the House Public Utilities Committee.5 ° The
chairman's draft bill placed substantial discretion in the commission to detariff
and deregulate services as well as to adopt alternative methods of regulation.54
According to the chairman, it attempted to "balance the needs of the telecommunications industry in an information-hungry society with the need for regulatory
protection in those circumstances in which it is appropriate."' 2 Underlying this
approach was the conclusion that the premise of natural monopoly did not apply
in some circumstances. 3 Thus, the commission sought the ability to respond

53 Id. at 4.
533 Id.

at 5.

53 Testimony of William Spratley, Office of Consumers' Counsel (Oct. 29, 1987) at 1.
5 Id., passim.
53 Id. at 1.
-3 Interview of John Duffy, Legislative Director of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (Feb. 23,
1990).
38

id.

53 The statement is based on interviews with several participants in the process by the author.
'*0 Testimony of Thomas Chema, Chairman, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (Oct. 14, 1988); Letter
of Jacqueline Bracken, State Legislative Director for the Office of Consumers' Counsel, to State Rep.
Frank Sawyer (Nov. 1,1988), at 1.
34 Sub. H.B. 563, 117th General Assembly, 2d Sess. (1988).
'4 Testimony of Thomas Chema, supra note 540, at 1.

u Id. at 2.
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to varying conditions in a flexible manner. As the chairman further suggested in
his testimony, "We need to put in place a system that will permit us to recognize
where effective competition exists and allow us [to] respond to it by relaxing the
regulation of that segment. At the same time, the system must permit us to
maintain regulatory control where monopoly characteristics continue."" The
bill was not directed at creating lifeline rates or local measured service, or
affecting extended area service.m5
Opposition to the substitute bill came from two sources. MCI objected to
the bill because it feared that the local exchange companies would attempt to take
advantage of additional flexibility to assign costs to access, a monopoly
service. "4 Its testimony concluded, "MCI cannot ... endorse this bill so long as
serious questions remain regarding the provision of monopoly access, the potential
for cross-subsidization and the effect of deregulation without public participation
in a formal hearing process.""'
Consumer groups also objected to the bill.5"" In addition to the concerns
he raised in the bill's initial hearings,549 the Consumers' Counsel also objected
to the wide latitude given to the commission to adopt various regulatory
approaches, and the freedom of the companies to avoid reregulation. 550 He also
551
urged additional consumer input into the bill's language prior to its adoption.
The legislative director of the Office of Consumers' Counsel further noted that
the bill did not prevent unfavorable cross-subsidies, did not adequately provide
for maintenance of service standards, permitted costs to be shifted to the least
price sensitive customers, and failed to identify who should pay the costs of
increased innovation. 552 The Ohio Association of Realtors also voiced opposition to the bill because its members feared that the phone companies would use
it as a means of mandating local measured service.553

5mId.
'4

Id. at 3.

5'* Testimony of MCI Telecommunications Corp., undated, at 3.
M7 Id.
-5"In addition to the objections of the Office of Consumers' Counsel, the American Association for
Retired Persons and the City of Cleveland testified against the bill in hearings before the Ohio Senate.
Memorandum of Laura Skiby to the Ohio Senate Ways and Means Committee, Nov. 10, 1988 (detailing
the testimony concerning House Bill 563 and Senate Bill 443).
'4

See supra text accompanying notes 534-36.
of William Spratley, Office of Consumers' Counsel, Nov. 10, 1988, at 3-4.

550 Testimony

-

Id. at 2.

552 Letter

of Jacqueline Bracken, State Legislative Director for the Office of Consumers' Counsel to State

Rep. Frank Sawyer, Nov. 1, 1988, at 1-2.
5"3Interview of John Duffy, Legislative Director for the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (Feb. 23,
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These and other similar arguments presented to the Ohio Senate did not
succeed in slowing the bill's progress.5.5 The substitute bill containing the basic
element of the final version emerged from the House of Representatives on
November 17, 1988, and passed the Ohio Senate on November 18. The House
concurred in Senate amendments to the bill on December 8. The Governor
approved the bill on December 15, 1988, and the effective date for the operative
provisions of the bill was March 17, 1989.
Provisions of House Bill 563
The significant portions of the bill are contained in five new sections of
the Revised Code.555 First, several significant definitions are set out in section
4927.01. Subsection (A) defines "basic local exchange service" as the provision
of access and usage of telephone facilities to complete non-long distance
calls.556 Subsection (C) then defines "public telecommunications service" as
everything except the physical plant that provides the service, the provision of
telephone equipment, and broadcast or cable services.557 These definitions
interplay among the remainder of the sections in defining the scope of deregulation which the commission is authorized to address.
Section 4927.02 sets out the policy behind the enactment of the bill. Like
the original bill, the resulting law contains a variety of goals no one is likely to
oppose. In addressing deregulation, the commission is directed to consider the
policy of the state to maintain basic service,558 maintain just and reasonable
rates, 559 encourage innovation,- ° promote diversity of options,56' and "recognize the continuing emergence of a competitive telecommunications environment through flexible regulatory treatment of public telecommunications services
where appropriate."-62 The law fails to offer any weights to be assigned to the
various interests, other than their rank order.
To achieve these stated goals, the General Assembly gave the commission
broad authority to implement alternative rate making and other deregulatory

-5- Memorandum of Laura Skiby to the Ohio Senate Ways and Means Committee, Nov. 10, 1988
(detailing the testimony concerning House Bill 563 and Senate Bill 443).
-" The bill also provided for limitations on mergers through the enactment of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §

5

4905.402 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
s Id. § 4927.01 (A).

s Id. § 4927.01(D).
"' Id. § 4927.02(A)(1).
5" Id. § 4927.02(A)(2).
-So Id. § 4927.02(A)(3).

'd.I § 4927.02(A)(4).
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actions in section 4927.03 and 4927.04. Section 4927.03(A) provides that the
commission, on its own initiative or the application of a telephone company and
after notice and comment (and a hearing if the commission deems it necessary),
may exempt a telephone company from the general requirements of Chapter
4905563 and the rate making requirements of Chapter 4909, or apply alternative
regulatory requirements on a service. 5' There are three limitations on this
general power. First, the commission must find that the change in regulation or
exemption is in the public interest. 565 Second, the commission must find that the
telephone company is subject to competition with respect to the service or that
customers have reasonably available altematives. 5' Third, the provision does
not apply to the provision of basic local service if it would result in an exemption
or "impair the exclusive right of any telephone company ... to provide basic local
exchange service in the local service areas in which such service is provided by
the company on the effective date of this section." 567
The bill then sets out several criteria for determining if the service for
which alternative regulation or an exemption is sought is competitive.5 68 The
factors include the number and size of alternative producers, the availability of
services for alternative providers, the availability of functional equivalents or
substitutes, and other indicators of market power such as market share, growth of
market share, ease of entry, and affiliations of producers.569
Once the commission has approved an exemption or change in regulation
from that provided by the other sections of the Revised Code, it may rescind or
modify that change upon notice and hearing if it finds that the conditions for
approval no longer exist, or if the change is in the public interest.570 However,
if a service has been deregulated for more than eight years, the affected company
must consent to a return to regulation. 5"
Section 4927.04 provides the commission with the authority to adopt
alternative methods of rate making. In any rate making proceeding for which an
exemption or alternative procedure has not been established under section
4927.03, the commission may use an alternative if it is in the public interest and,

3' See supra text accompanying notes 263-92.
5' OrIo
565Id.

REV. CODE ANN. § 4927.03(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1990).

I' § 4927.03(A)(1)(a)-(b).
ld.
Id. § 4927.03(B).
5' Id. § 4927.03(A)(2).
5 Id. § 4927.03(A)(2)(a)-(d).
"0 Id. § 4927.03(D).
"7
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5 72 The statute then
if proposed by the commission, the company consents.
provides another laundry list of alternative considerations to guide the commission:

Alternative methods include, but are not limited
to, methods that maintain universal telephone
service in the state; minimize the costs and time
expended in the regulatory process; tend to
assess the cost of any telecommunications service to the entity or service that causes such
costs to be incurred; afford rate stability; promote and reward efficiency, quality of service, or
cost containment by telephone companies; or
provide sufficient flexibility and incentives to the
telecommunications industry to achieve high
quality, technologically advanced and universally
services at just and
available telecommunications 573
reasonable rates and charges.
As in the case of the provision concerning alternative regulation and exemptions,
one can only guess at the relative importance of each of the factors, other than to
note their rank order. The statute offers no assistance in resolving the inherent
conflicts between the various goals. Once again, the Legislature apparently left
that determination to the commission.
Another interesting and unusual proviso in both sections 4927.03 and
4927.04 is that companies need not be treated consistently. That is, the commission need not permit all companies to adopt the same kinds of exemptions,
alternative regulatory structures, or rate making methods.5 7 4 Thus, the commission could base regulation on the amount of dominance that a particular party has
within a market.
Finally, the General Assembly provided for the creation of a Telecommunications Advisory Council. Made up of political, industry, and general public
representatives, the council was directed to report to the Governor and the General
Assembly on the state of the telecommunications industry in Ohio, and to
evaluate whether the actions of the Public Utilities Commission were consistent
with the policies contained in the statement of purpose of the legislation.7

37

Id. § 4927.04(A).

57

Id.

574 Id. §§ 4927.03(C) and 4927.04(C).
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Summary
This legal change was remarkable in several respects. First was the speed
with which the legislature acted once the commission joined the legislative
sponsors of the bill. Second was the striking amount of discretion provided to the
commission by the General Assembly. With few exceptions, there is no direction
contained in House Bill 563. Instead of the formulaic process which is inherent
in traditional ratemaking,576 the commission was directed to adopt whatever
procedures appeared appropriate in light of the public interest and the competitive
exigencies of the particular situation. Thus, it fell to the commission to give
operational meaning to the legislation, and this time court review would prove
an even less effective check on the commission's choices. In substance, then, the
General Assembly made a political choice to hand off the policy making process
associated with telecommunications to the executive branch and its commissioners.
In this regard, House Bill 563 continues the tradition of placing a great
deal of discretion in the hands of the commission for the process of dealing with
changes in the telecommunications market and changing federal regulation. That
tradition started with the commission's assertion of expanded authority in the
early 1980s to address the changes in federal regulation.577 It continued with the
judiciary's acquiescence in the MCI cases.578 It was reinforced in House Bill
563 by the General Assembly's assignment to the commission the tasks of
deciding the very nature of regulation for competitive services and of devising
alternative rate making approaches for basic exchange service. 57 9 House Bill 563
thus confirms the commission's initial actions.
Despite the rhetorical nod to deregulation, there is nothing in the bill
which requires change. The bill is designed around a standard of public interest
protection which has essentially no intrinsic meaning. 58° It places a great deal

57 See supra text accompanying notes 294-311.
577 See supra text accompanying notes 327-454.
57 See supra text accompanying notes 462-75.
S79See
ir

supra text accompanying notes 555-75.

Pierce, The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX L REv. 469,

478-79 (1985):

mhe characterization of... traditional standards a empty means

that they impose no limit on the substantive agency discretion.
The agency's decision-making process is affected by judicial
review, in the sense that it must follow specified procedures,
support findings with evidence, and state its reasons for acting.
If the agency takes those steps, however, its decision-making
process can produce virtually any substantive result that lies on
the broad spectrum of results that are consistent with any
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
political view 1991
held by a significant portion of the population.
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of discretion in the hands of the commission, and further frees the commission
from the requirement of holding hearings to determine the factual basis for its
decisions to exempt, or otherwise deregulate, a particular service offering.58'
While this flexibility could be used to avoid the effects of current regulation, this
need not be the case, for the commission is just as free not to act or to use the
authority to freeze existing problems associated with regulation into the
"competitive" system.
Thus, there is a strange twist of logic inherent in the General Assembly's
action. As the legislative director of the commission remarked in an interview,
House Bill 563 is not a deregulation bill. 5 2 Rather, it permits the commission
to act in any manner it sees is in the public interest 58 3 To the extent that the
commission has sought to maintain past payments from long distance companies
to local exchange companies on a noncost basis, those may continue if they are
deemed in the public interest. Moreover, the legislative changes reinforce this
position with the requirement that any change be free of adverse effects on local
exchange service.'" Likewise, the commission could choose to retain those
oversight and tariff structures that it feels are necessary as a result of complaints
(as it did in the case of altemative operator services regulation 8 5 ), despite the
lack of any sound economic argument that consumers are faced with a monopoly
provider or that the complaints are not the ordinary effects of competition and the
process of working out poor providers. Fundamentally, therefore, House Bill 563
represents an imprecise political accommodation rather than an economic response
by the Legislature.
LEsSONs To BE APPLIED
The movement away from old ways of doing things has been difficult,
and likely will continue to be so. 5 Although the statutory mandate gives the
commission the authority to adopt more competitive solutions, however, neither
the commission nor the legislature demonstrated in any meaningful way how
change will be accomplished. The comments of the players in the commission's
5-" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4927.03(A) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
5"2 Interview of John Duffy, Legislative Director of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (Feb. 23,

1990).
"' OrnO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4927.03 & 4927.04 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
54 OtIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4927.03(B) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
5- See supra text accompanying notes 436-53.

"" A more recent example is the commission's treatment of company-specific access charges. The
process was marked by another admission of the commission that the separation of costs is essentially a
matter of guess work. The commission thus adopted in a recent General Telephone case an arbitrary split
of the nontraffic sensitive costs and rejected the recommendations of all litigants including its own staff
recommendation. Opinion and Order, GTE North Inc., No. 87-1307-TP-AIR, slip op. at 41-50 (Pub. Util.
Comm'n of Ohio, Oct. 28, 1988), affd sub nom., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
74
Ohio, 51 Ohio St. 3d 150, 555 N.E.2d 288 (1990).

Darr: Telephone Services
Fall, 1990]

TELEPHONE SERVICES

third inquiry into the emerging competitive environment likewise do not
demonstrate any planned approach to deregulation, apart from the expected
competitive positioning (or posturing). Nonetheless, the form of the statute and,

often explicitly, the players suggest that the commission must address the new
environment with some sort of partial regulation. If the lessons of deregulation,
at the federal level are meaningful, careful planning and new approaches will be
the key to adjusting the competing interests which will emerge as the forms of
subsidy continue to break down in the competitive environment
Issues in the "563"Investigation
Following the adoption of House Bill 563, the commission initiated an
investigation to define the issues raised by the Ohio legislature's new instructions
and grant of discretion.8 7 The original list of issues identified by the commission for review 588 reflected many of the same concerns discussed in the earlier
regulatory framework dockets.5 "9 The commission divided the inquiry into four
industry segments and asked for comments directed at each segment.
As expected, the interexchange carriers suggested that they deserved
additional freedom for themselves but argued that other parties should not fare so
well. AT&T took the position that there was extensive competition, but feared the
local exchange bottleneck. 590 The other interexchange carriers that filed

comments, MCI, U.S. Sprint, and Litel, not only feared the bottleneck, but also
AT&T."' All then voiced a desire for greater freedom from current regulation
of rates, rate changes, certification, and notification procedures in the "competi-

5" Entry, Implementation of Sections 4927.01 through 4927.05, Revised Code, as They Relate to
Competitive Telecommunications Services, No. 89-563-TP-COI (June 13, 1989) (hereinafter Competitive
Telecommunications Services).
"2 Id., Attachment A (Aug. 15, 1989). Each segment of the industry was presented with essentially the
same questions concerning its operation in a competitive market. For example, the first section was
addressed to the concerns of the interexchange carriers. Id. at 1-4. First, the commission asked what level
of regulation should be applied. Id., Attachment A at 1. Second, the commission raised again the issue
of different levels of regulation for carriers based on market dominance. Id. Third, the commission asked
whether regulation of interexchange carriers affiliated with local exchange companies should be different.
Id. Fourth, the commission asked for comments on whether specific criteria needed to be developed to
define whether a company was subject to competition. Id., Attachment A at 2. Fifth, the commission
inquired as to the parts of current streamlined regulation that needed change. Id., Attachment A at 2-3.
Sixth, the commission raised the question of what information should be kept confidential. Id., Attachment
A at 3. Seventh, the commission questioned what service standards should apply to the interexchange
companies. Id. Eighth, the commission raised the issue of what continuing reporting requirements should
be maintained. Id., Attachment A at 4. Finally, the commission requested comments on the types of
measures it should consider to prevent anticompetitive behavior and what future monitoring it should
establish to assure that the new regulatory process was operating in the public interest. Id.
59 See supra text accompanying notes 363-95.
o AT&T Comments, Competitive Telephone Services, supra note 587, at 4-5.
"'

Comments of MCI Telecommunications Corp., id. at 2; Comments of U.S. Sprint, id. at 1; Comments
Wireless Co., id. at 2-3.
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tive" portions of the market for long distance service.r 92 For those less competi-

tive portions of the market, however, the commenters favored
the retention of
593
dominant carrier or monopoly regulation of the bottleneck.

Responses to the commission inquiry concerning regulation of the local
exchange companies were fairly similar. The local exchange companies agreed
that additional streamlining was necessary. 594 Many noted the advantages of

detariffing prices for competitive services. 595 Two companies suggested levels

of regulation based on the amount of existing competition.596 In general, the

commenters suggested that the commission not attempt to be overly precise in
defining what constituted competition.597 One commenter went so far as to
suggest that the commission establish a special group to monitor the marketplace

for competitive changes as a basis for making proposals as to what services
deserved varying regulation. 59 The parties also agreed that the commission
lacked the authority to intervene in competitive disputes. 599 Finally, two
commenters
suggested that the commission adopt some form of price cap
6 °
policy. 0
As previously noted, the interexchange companies did not agree with the

local exchange companies sanguine appraisal of their own position. Uniformly,
the interexchange companies noted the local exchange bottleneck and suggested

the need for accounting separations for competitive and noncompetitive

59

See, e.g., Comments of AT&T, id., passirm.

Comments of AT&T, id. at 36-45; Comments of U.S. Sprint, id. at 12; Comments of MCI
Telecommunications Corp., id. at 8. The dichotomy of interests was also reflected in the reply comments
of the parties in which they continued to debate the dominant status of AT&T. See, e.g., Reply Comments
of MCI Telecommunications Corp., id.
s9 Initial Comments of the Ohio Bell Telephone Co., id. at 9-11 (Dec. 4, 1989) (hereinafter as Ohio Bell
'3

Comments); Initial Comments of Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co., id. at 11-13 (hereinafter as Cincinnati
Bell Comments); Initial Comments of GTE North Incorporated, id. at 9 (hereinafter as GTE Comments);
Initial Comments of United Telephone Co. of Ohio, id. at 6 (hereinafter as United Comments); Comments
of Central Telephone Co. of Ohio, id. at 10 (hereinafter as Central Comments); Joint Comments of Alltel
Ohio, Inc., The Elyria Telephone Co. and the Western Reserve Telephone Co. regarding Local Exchange
Carriers, and Request for Service of Comments regarding Interexehange Carriers, Radio Common Carriers
and Cellular Carriers, id.at 2 (hereinafter as Alltel Comments).
595 Ohio Bell Comments, id. at 12, 16; United Comments, hi at 7; Alltel Comments, id. at 4; Cincinnati
Bell Comments, id. at 10.
-' United Comments, id. at 7-8; GTE Comments, id. at 5.
s9 Ohio Bell Comments, id. at 14; Alltel Comments, id. at 5; United Comments, id. at 10; Central
Comments, id. at 14 (competition not defined by market share). General Telephone urged that the
commission consider contestability of markets. GTE Comments, id. at 11.
3" Cincinnati Bell Comments, id. at 6-7.
s" See, e.g., Ohio Bell Comments, id. at 21.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
6m Central Comments, id. at 28-40, GTE Comments,

i. at 4-6 and Appendix A.
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services."°
The third and fourth areas of inquiry addressed the regulation of radio
common carriers and cellular telephone companies. They agreed that reduced
regulation was appropriate. In this case, however, there were much stronger
arguments concerning competition over quality, substitution of other products, and
price competition.6" The need for regulation was further reduced by the
nonessential nature of cellular' and paging services offered by these companies
and the free movement of customers among providers.' Not surprisingly,
however, these companies were also concerned about connections with
6 5 local
telephone systems necessary to complete connections for their services. 0
Consistent with their opposition to House Bill 563, 606 several consumer
representatives also filed comments and opposed reduced regulation. 7 In
addition to the general concern that consumers should not bear the costs of
service changes and the effects of competition that could shift costs, 608 they also
tended to agree on the need for full hearings when deregulation was sought.6
There were further suggestions regarding full or accounting separations of
competitive and noncompetitive services610 and the protection of basic service.61
A Theory of PartialRegulation Revisited
Posturing aside, the comments in the 563 investigation point to basic
problems with partial deregulation. In a nearly perfect world, competition would
operate in those markets that are competitive, regulation would operate in those

6', See, e.g., Comments of AT&T, id. at 36, 45-46; Comments of MCI Telecommunications Corp., id. at

6.
6=2See, e.g., Comments of Ameritech Mobile, id. at 1-3.
60

Id. at 8.

Comments of Cincinnati SMSA Limited Partnership, id at 5.
Comments of GTE Mobilnet, id. at 9.
See supra text accompanying notes 534-36 and 546-54.
The exception was the representative of the Federal Government which felt that some deregulation
assisted the government in its obligation for competitive bidding. Comments of the Dept. of the Army,
Competitive Telecommunications Services, supra note 587.
Comments of the Office of Consumers' Counsel, id. at 4; Comments of the Ohio Ass'n of Realtors,

id. at 1.
6o Comments of the City of Cleveland, id. at 4; Comments of the Office of Consumers' Counsel, id. at

2.
610

Comments of the Office of Consumers' Counsel, id. at 7.

6i Comments of the Greater Cleveland Welfare Rights Orianization, id. at 1. The realtor association

further voiced its concern over local measured service as a mandatory rate structure. Comments of the
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of Realtors, id. at 1-2. 1991
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that are not, and effective pricing policies based on accurate assessments of costs
would determine the cost of access to monopoly on terms that neither discriminate
nor subsidize any particular group. 612 Regulation would be designed to address
particular forms of market failure which might exist (e.g. informational failures
or the existence of natural monopoly service or bottlenecks 613). Protection for
universal service would arise with full recognition of its costs, plus some
allowance for protecting low income individuals.614
The real world, however, differs in important respects from the economic
model of mixed markets. First, the industry does not operate in nice, clean
segments.6 15 Second, the informational needs to support such a system are
tremendous.616 Third, one must accept at the beginning one fundamental
principle: the decision to deregulate, detariff, or maintain current or higher levels
of regulation remains essentially political. Economic perfection is not possible
because the conflicting policies inherent in the system would not permit it. (In
that sense, the criticisms of the PUCO, the courts, and the FCC are unfair.)
Indeed, economists recognize as much:
What these differences signify is that the problems addressed are difficult and, in a sense,
insoluble, more political than scientific. Our
ablest economists are much like the seven blind
men given the task of describing the elephant by
[T]he wise synthesizer will
sense of touch ....
have to do more than simply add the reports
together, or count majorities on disputed issues;
he or she will have to achieve and rely on a
gestalt impression rather than any table of measurements. ... It remains for politicians, threading
an uncertain path through the half-lighted murk,
to reconcile the conflicting61interests that are the
reality behind the rhetoric.
That conclusion certainly is consistent with what has happened in the last ten
years at both the federal and state levels.

612

See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.

For an interesting discussion of the need to maintain

regulation in those residual pockets of monopoly left by divestiture, see Brennan, supra note 121, and
Gabel, supra note 48.
613See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
614 Kahn & Shew, supra note 50,at 253-54.

613 See supra text accompanying notes 8-72.
616See infra text accompanying note 689.
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180, 184-85 (Aug. 1984)
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To address the multiple concerns facing regulators, there are some modest
sensible proposals. First, regulators should consider some careful planning.
Second, the commission should consider adopting some of the tools of antitrust
law as a means for determining the scope of its regulatory efforts. Third, the
commission should consider applying some of the tools developed at the federal
level and by other states, in modifying existing interim regulation in ways which
are consistent with the perceived market failures it may identify and with the
theoretical model of regulation in the mixed market place of telecommunications.
Planning
Several years ago, Professor Trebing correctly noted that regulation will
have to respond at a more sophisticated level to address the changing environment.6 " First, he proposed improved regulatory planning to address the need
for new facilities and their mix.61 9 Second, he suggested that consideration of
equity and distributional issues become a part of the planning. 620 "These issues
include the obvious problems of assuring service to low-income consumers and
thin markets, but they also include more sophisticated issues, such as the
secondary effects of deaveraging, the impact of telecommunications modernization
plans on the average of service to all classes of customers, and the intergenerational impact of phase-in plans and accelerated cost recovery." 62' Third, he noted
the need for adequate determinations of the cost of service for residual monopoly
markets. Fourth, he concluded that regulators will have to acquire a sensitivity for
market structure in making decisions, both in terms of determining which markets
to deregulate and identifying those industry practices which are restrictive and
thus frustrate consumer welfare enhancing results.m
The planning process would address two questions in particular. First, the
commission needs to develop a clearer picture of the players and their relative
market power. Indeed, House Bill 563 requires the commission to premise its
decision- making on the ability of the players to exercise control over price and
quantity. Second, the commission must determine the extent to which it wants to
create markets which may infringe on the past monopoly structure (without
infringing on basic local exchange). In this regard, the role of the past subsidies
and the concerns over who should pay for improvements to the system will raise
the kinds of fundamental political questions the commission has avoided or
sought to ignore. If the commission plans to encourage greater competition in the
telecommunications market, it will have to devise the appropriate tools for the

"'

Trebing, supra note 16, at 627-28.

"'

Id. at 628.

6wId.
621 Id.
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particular niches in the marketplace which are likely to emerge. To the extent that
the power exists, the role of regulation is greater. To the extent that it does not
exist, however, the role of regulation is doubtful.
Antitrust Tools
If the legislative premise for House Bill 563 is taken seriously, the focus
of the regulation will necessarily change from regulating a monopoly to
overseeing a mixture of competitive and noncompetitive services. In this regard,
the commission may seek to draw from another body of literature, antitrust law,
to guide its decision making. This approach to regulation may at first seem
somewhat contradictory, but the use of antitrust theory is merely the appropriate
counterpart of regulation in those sections of the market that can operate
competitively. 3 Antitrust seeks to achieve the benefits of competition indirectly
by seeking to eliminate various forms of anticompetitive behavior." 4 Given the
requirement that the commission determine that competition exists when making
the decision to deregulate, it is readily apparent that the commission must use the
tools of antitrust to address these questions.
The first application of antitrust approaches would be in the identification
of companies with some market power. At the heart of this issue is a determination of whether a company can raise prices or limit output successfully. In many
sectors of the telecommunications market, there should be no special problems
which are not common to all such determinations. In other instances in which the
dominant carrier can potentially exhibit leverage, additional care must naturally
be used.
While the determination of monopoly status is in itself no small task,
the regulation of telecommunications is marked with a growing body of literature
and decisions which can serve as guides for the determination. In particular, the
commission might use determinations of essential facilities control as a method
to determine potential points in the system for applying greater regulatory muscle.
1. The Essential Facilities Doctrine
Despite the lack of Supreme Court

6

or academic6 27 endorsement, the

62' See generally, Breyer, supra note 55.
614

Id. at 1006.

625 See
6
26 The

infra note 633 for materials containing the relevant discussion.

U.S. Supreme Court has never expressly recognized the doctrine as a basis for liability under the
Sherman Act. It had a chance to do so in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973),
reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 910 (1973), and Aspen HighlandSkiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585
(1985), in which the lower courts based their decisions on essential facility grounds, but the Court found

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
liability under different theories.
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courts continue to explore the application of the essential facilities doctrine as a
means of addressing monopoly power questions. Importantly, the courts have
looked to the essential facilities doctrine as a basis for addressing the rights of
regulated monopolies to effect the actions of their competitors by restricting
access.6 8 Thus, the analysis in this area reflects the same fundamental concerns
raised by actions to deregulate the vertical activities of local exchange companies
which control the access to the network through their monopoly grant of basic
exchange service. To the extent that the legal analysis is applicable, a commission
could look to this antitrust doctrine as a tool to identify those players who can
exert market power, and thus require additional regulatory scrutiny.
2. The Legal Analysis
The rationale for applying the doctrine in the case of a regulated utility
is consistent with many of the same concerns raised in the context of rate
regulation of an industry operating in both the competitive and noncompetitive
arenas:
If a [Bell Operating Company] or a Regional
Holding Company were permitted to charge
different customers different rates for exchange
access or local exchange facilities, depending
upon whether those customers purchased other
products or services sold by the BOC or Regional Holding Company, then it could ... exploit its
"bottleneck" monopoly over exchange access and
local exchange facilities to the detriment of its
competitors and ultimately of consumers of
telecommunications services. The difference
between charging a competitor a markedly higher
price for access and denying access altogether is,
after all, a difference of degree, not of kind. ... It
is clearly reasonable to read the MFJ's nondiscrimination provisions in light of its fundamental
purpose to stymie efforts by a local monopoly to
use its stranglehold on essential facilities and
services to thwart effective competition in areas
where its monopoly position was not protected

27

6

See, e.g., Reiffen & Kleit, Terminal RailroadRevisited: Foreclosureof an EssentialFacility or Simple

HorizontalMonopoly?, 33 J.L & ECON. 419 (1990).

6,8 Id. atby
422.
Published
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by the MFJ.629

Simply put, the rationale for the court's action is to prevent the monopoly from
exercising control of its critical facility as a means of preventing competition or
extorting monopoly rents from downstream competitors.
In the context of antitrust, the essential facilities doctrine consists of the
application of four factual assertions to reach the conclusion that an unfair use of
monopoly power is being applied to a competitor.630 First, the monopolist must
control an essential facility. 631 A careful review of this requirement reveals that
two fundamental issues are presented. First, there must be a monopolist. Second,
the facility must be essential. Neither term is self-defining and the recent case law
demonstrates the importance of each requirement.
To be liable, the actor must be a monopolist who can exercise market
power.632 Though one of the more difficult problems in antitrust law is the
determination of market power,633 the courts historically have reasoned that a
substantial share of the market carries with it market power. For example, in the
Otter Tail case, 634 the court inferred that Otter Tail had market power based on
the estimates of its market share, which ranged from 75 to 91 percent.635 The

States v. Western Elec. Co., 846 F.2d 1422, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 424
(1988).
m There is a violation of Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act when a firm or group of firms denies a
competitor access to something considered essential to competition in a market. The leading case applying
the essential facilities doctrine is MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). In that case, the Seventh Circuit listed four elements necessary
to a finding of liability under the doctrine:
(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) denial of the use of
the facility to a competitor, and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.
Id. at 1132-33. In United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1981), Judge Greene
stated the doctrine this way: "[A]ny company which controls an 'essential facility' or a 'strategic
bottleneck' in the market violates the antitrust laws if it fails to make access to that facility available to
its competitors on fair and reasonable terms that do not disadvantage them." Id. at 1352-53. Judge Greene
found this to be the "applicable legal standard" in the case and thus denied A.T.&T.'s motion for
summary judgment in concluding that A.T.&T. had monopolized the intercity services (long distance)
market by not permitting its long distance competitors to interconnect with local exchanges.
63 See infra text accompanying notes 651-57.
632 Flip Side Productions v. Jam Productions, 843 F.2d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 US.
909 (1988).
633See P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTrRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT,AND CASES 567-82 (4th ed.
1988); 2 P. AREEDA AND D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw chs. 5 and 8 (1977 & Supp. 1987); E. GELHORN,
ANTTrRuST LAW AND ECONOMICS 113-35 (1986); Symposium, EmpiricalApproaches to Market Power,
32 J. L. & ECON. S1-S275 (1989); Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REV.
937 (1981).
634 United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971), affd in part and remanded
in part, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
633Id. at 58-59.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
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difficulty of this approach is two fold. First, it is difficult to define the proper
geographic and product markets. "We try to include in the relevant market only
those suppliers--of the same or related product in the same or related geographic
area--whose existence significantly restrains the defendant's power., 63 6 As the
complexity of the market increases due to product differentiation and substitution,
so to do the difficulties of measurement.6 37 Second, factors other than market
share may affect the ability of the firm to engage in monopoly behavior.638
Thus, the process of determining monopoly power is, by definition, flexible.
While these problems would seemingly be reduced in the case of a utility
with a regulated franchise, such is not the case. On the one hand, the utility is
clearly granted a tremendous share of the market In the case of a local telephone
company, it may be the exclusive provider of some telecommunications service.
On the other hand, the utility is subject to commission regulation based on the
premise that regulation will prohibit the use of monopoly power, either in the
form of higher prices or less efficient service. The courts addressing the issue of
the monopoly power of a utility have thus faced an additional question of whether
the utility can successfully use its monopoly status.639 The issue is whether the
company can effectively avoid the regulatory structure,' or use (and abuse) it
as a barrier to entry to other competitors."'
Additionally, the monopolist must control an essential facility. Facilities
are deemed essential by the apparent lack of reasonable substitutes available to
competitors. In the Otter Tail case, for example, there was no effective substitute
for the transmission facilities sought by competing municipal power systems. 2
In Flip Side Productions, Inc. v. Jam Productions, 3 however, evidence of
available alternatives demonstrated that the facility was not essential to competition. The plaintiff was a concert promoter. It alleged that the defendants
exclusively controlled the Rosemont Horizon, a concert hall, in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff also alleged that the Horizon was an
essential facility for the booking and promotion of concerts in the Chicago area.
Other sizable concert facilities, however, were available and had in fact been used

636P.

3
6m

AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, supra note 633, at 572.

See id at 575-80.
See, e.g., Scheffman & Spiller, Introduction: Empirical Approaches to Market Power, 32 J. L &

ECON. S3, S9 (1989).
the courts have refused to conclude that the utility is free of antitrust review because it is
regulated. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372-75 (1973). See generally, Note, The
Application of Antitrust Laws to Telecommunications, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 497, 505-14 (1981).
6o United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1347-48 (D.D.C. 1981).
6"Generally,

"' Southern Pacific Comm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1001 (D.C. App. 1984),

cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985).
mOtter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. at 59.
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by the plaintiff for large concerts in the Chicago area." The court said that the
plaintiff would lose even if it had been foreclosed from using any of these
facilities, because there was still competition for the concert-going consumer
among those who controlled the facilities." 5
Likewise, several activities by Ohio Bell in the distribution and
production of Yellow Pages directories have been held to be outside the essential
facilities doctrine. In Directory Sales Management v. Ohio Bell Telephone
Co.,6' the court concluded that the codelivery of the Yellow Pages with the
White Pages, billing and collections for classified advertising in the Yellow Pages,
and the provision of business classifications were not essential facilities to
competitors of Bell seeking to enter directory services, because alternatives were
reasonably available and the information was already available to competitors. (In
the case of the business classifications sought by the plaintiff, the court further
concluded that the information was unreliable and, therefore, rejected the claim
of necessity. 7 )
Second, the competitor must be practically unable to duplicate the
facility." 8 By this, the courts have determined that the competitor would find
it economically infeasible to reproduce the facility to which it is seeking
access. 649 Existing alternatives, or ones that can be reasonably developed by the
competitor, will frustrate the claim.6 0
Third, the monopolist must deny access of the facility to the competitor.651 There are two implied requirements. First, the alleged monopolist must
control access to the essential facility.6 2 Second, the denial must be directed at
a potential or actual competitor.653 Absent either of these factors, there is no
competitive disadvantage associated with the denial.

64 Flip Side Productions,843 F.2d at 1034.
6
0 id.
6'6 833 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1987).
"7

Id. at 613.

6" See supra note 630.
6'9 Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
6o City of Malden v. Union Elec. Co., 887 F.2d 157, 161-62 (8th Cir. 1989); Twin Laboratories, Inc. v.

Weider Health and Fitness, 720 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 900 F.2d 566 2d Cir. (1990).
0' See supra note 630.
652United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1368 (2d Cir. 1988)(NFL
did not control access to network television).
6" Ferguson v. Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, 848 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1988)(no claim stated
against owner of facility that did not compete with the plaintiff in the provision of trade shows); Interface
Group v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 816 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987)(no claim stated against owner of
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
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Fourth, it must be feasible for the monopolist to provide the facility.6-

In Otter Tail, it was apparently feasible for the utility to provide the transmission
because it had provided transmission services in its own sales to the municipali-

ties previously, and it regularly wheeled power for other entities.655 In contrast,
a utility is not required to provide its facilities under circumstances in which it

will lose money on the transaction.'
3. Application to State Utility Regulation
In the case of utilities regulation, the commission is not interested in
determining antitrust liability. Rather, it may use a modified standard to establish

those instances in which regulatory intervention is necessary. In essence, the
commission would seek to determine if the owner of the facility currently has

monopoly power over an essential facility that others could not reasonably
duplicate, and which could be used by competitors without injury to the owner's
interest or to the integrity of the facility. Obviously, this standard raises a host of

complicated factual questions. But these questions appear especially amenable to
a process of administrative regulation with its expertise and resources.
Dealing with the Residual Monopoly

Once the commission has identified a company with a bottleneck control
of an essential facility, its plan would dictate a series of decisions. Foremost
would be the determination of access and its cost to the facility. Fundamentally,

the commission would determine that the owner could not deny access to others
except under limited conditions, and would set a rate and technical standards for

that access on a nondiscriminatory basis. Other continuing problems would

6 See supra note 630.
Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. at 57, 60-61.
- City of Malden v. Union Elec. Co., 887 F.2d 157, 162 (8th Cir. 1989). This element of reasonableness
gives rise in the telecommunications area to a rather odd defense that permits the utility in the first
instance to determine if it is proper to provide an interconnection. Under the Federal Communications Act,
a common carrier may refuse to provide an interconnection if it determines that the connection is not in
the public interest. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982) provides:
It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio to furnish such communication service upon
reasonable request therefor, and, in accordance with the orders of the Commission,
in cases where the Commission, after opportunity for hearing, finds such action
necessary or desirable in the public interest, to establish physical connections with
other carriers, to establish through routes and charges applicable thereto and the
divisions of such charges, and to establish and provide facilities and regulations for
operating such through routes.
The decisions apparently assume that the competitor will seek an agreement from the common carrier
prior to seeking a decision from the FCC approving the interconnection. For this defense to operate,
however, the carrier must reach a good faith conclusion that the denial is in the public interest Southern
Pacific Comm. Corp. v. American Tel. & TeL Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1009-10 (D.C. Cir. 1984); MCI Comm.
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Corp. v. American
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remain, however, because the monopolist could theoretically operate in both the
monopoly and competitive markets. At this point, the commission would have to
apply other tools to regulate the mixed market
1. Rate of Return and Incentive Regulation
Continued price regulation is an obvious approach to the portions of the
utility services which will likely remain noncompetitive, such as local exchange
service. Aggregate rate of return regulation, however, poses a problem of allowing
too high a return for some services, with the subsidization of others. In fact, some
services already suffer from these concerns, as various cost of service studies
suggest.- 7 Solutions to the problem exist. In particular, Selwyn suggests a more
liberal view of rate of return regulation which uses it as an incentive for the
utility to expand markets and introduce technology. 658 Thus, incentives such
as the retention of a part or all of the income over some set rate of return would
encourage the utility to market its services and cut costs more aggressively.
In addition, with greater incentives comes the need for a commission to
observe behavior in at least two areas. Incentive regulation may result in lower
service quality and pricing increases over the inelastic portions of the utility
market.659 The commission may be required to demand much more detailed
information concerning pricing and costs of particular service offerings. 660
Price caps" may also be an alternative to cost of service regulation.
However, these present difficult allocation and political problems which the
commission may not want to address. First, price caps may be very difficult to
adopt. As the FCC learned, price caps without substantial consumer protections
are difficult to sell to the public and other political actors.662 Ohio's recent
experience with price cap legislation likewise demonstrates the political pitfalls
of the approach. 663
Second, price caps tend to be experiments in practice. Historically, they
have not survived for very long periods of time, even when adopted due to

6"

Selwyn, supra note 46, at 218-19.
I'5id.
at 225.
I5'Jd.
at 225-26.

"0 Id. at 226.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 214-37.
6Q Peter Shields, The Politics of the Telecommunications Process: The Example of the FCC's Price Cap

Initiative. Center for the Advanced Study of Telecommunications Working File 1989-009, Sept. 1989.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss2/2
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changes in the economy or political reaction.'
Third, price caps present some real tradeoffs. The selling point for a price
cap is that it can reduce real cost by increasing the efficiency of the utility. The
utility has an incentive to produce at higher levels because it retains any
efficiency gains. 66 5 Further, the cap is intended to frustrate cross subsidies
because cost transfers are limited by the caps on prices for particular services. 666
Finally, there are likely to be reduced rate case expenses because rates are
allowed to move with inflation. 667
On the other hand, several problems exist with price caps. Initially, price
caps are fundamentally based on rate case determinations of prices.668 To the
extent there were problems in the calculation of rates or the distribution of costs
in the original rates, these problems are continued and potentially amplified. This
concern may add to the need for careful ongoing review of rates, thus offsetting
the benefits of reduced rate case expense. Moreover, this review is likely to be
more difficult conceptually because it is further removed from the rate base
information which drove traditional rate regulation. Moreover, price caps do not
the concern of technical barriers which might be used as barriers to
address
669
entry.
Finally, the use of price caps assumes a high degree of faith in the
commission's ability to set the appropriate productivity level. To the extent that
the commission misses in either direction, the very problems sought to be solved
are aggravated because the possibility of gouging and subsidies is once again
brought to the fore. To the extent that the offset is too low, the company is
offered a windfall. To the extent it is too high, the company is injured. Yet, there
is no apparent method to make the calculation. The FCC, for example, sought to
allay fears of price caps by adding a half percent to their calculation "[tlo ensure
that ratepayers benefit from price cap regulation"," while the Califomia
commission concluded that an even higher offset was appropriate because "recent
productivity trends should continue and even increase somewhat as a result of
continued technological improvements and adoption of an incentive-based

"4Raymond Lawton, Price Caps: Precedents and Predictions, Center for the Advanced Study of
Teleconmunications Working File 1989-002, June 1989.
"0Norris, Price Caps: An Alternative Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications Carriers, PuB.
UTIL FORT. 44 (Jan. 18, 1990).

"6Id.
"7 Id.
60 Id. at 44-45.
601.

HoRNiwNO, R. LAWrON, 1. RACSTER, W. POLARD,D. JONEs & V. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 88.
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regulatory framework."7' It is not particularly clear why there is an effective
two and a half percent difference between the federal and California calculations
for essentially the same factor in the formula. Yet, that factor is the driver of all
the rest of the benefits that are to arise from price caps. It appears in this light as
a rather thin thread.
2. Structural Separations
The related problem of separating competitive and noncompetitive
services offered by a monopoly also has several potential solutions. Because the
incentive exists to misallocate the costs of local service, one solution to avoid this
result is to require a separation of the regulated and nonregulated revenues and
costs:M
[Structural separations] force some telephone
companies to compete in certain offerings only
through organizations separate from their telephone operations--separate in personnel, facilities
equipment, marketing, operations, and capitalization. In addition, these regulations and decrees
restrict information flows between some telephone operations and the separate subsidiaries,
and limit some subsidiaries' revenues.673
Alternatively, the commission could use less aggressive forms of separations.
Among the nonstructural safeguards which the FCC has used are accounting
measures to prohibit cost shifting, network information disclosure, prohibition of
discrimination in favor of customers to access, and limits on the information
available to AT&T from the use of its system. 4 Ohio has addressed this
concern through regulatory separations to date. 675 However, it may want to take
a much closer look at the problem.
Full structural separation may be inappropriate, as the FCC and Ohio
apparently have concluded, because one of the benefits of the network is its
operating efficiency. 6 Just as one of the difficulties of divestiture is the loss
of economies of scope associated with common plant,67 separations may have

" California Price Cap, 107 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th at 91.
199.

672Kahn and Shew, supra note 50, at
673Lavey,
6'"

Ending StructuralSeparationfor Telephone Companies, 18 CONN. L. REV. 81 (1985).

Fowler, Halprin, and Schlichting, supra note 104, at 189-90.

675See supra text accompanying notes 363-65.
676

Selwyn, supra note 46, at 224.
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the untoward effect of creating greater costs than an integration of competitive
and noncompetitive activities of the utility. 678 (Economies of scope refers to the

ability of a single firm to produce several related services at a lower cost than the
separate production of each service.67 )

A partial solution to the potential for cross subsidization when structural
separation is not used is the creation of a set of cost allocators. 6 ° Commissions
could use prior cost information to form a base line for determining the proper
allocation of revenues for regulated activities."' Cost allocation, however, is
notoriously difficult in telecommunications, due to the common plant used in
operations.6 An additional weakness of accounting separations is that it
requires a high degree of administrative vigilance.8 3
There are several other common problems with a requirement that
separate subsidiaries or accounting separation be used to prevent cross-subsidization. First, the regulatory commission may have difficulty tracking the activities
of the subsidiaries as their numbers grow and activities become more complex.
Second, it is difficult to value the spin-off facility so that a transfer of value does
not occur. Finally, there is a likelihood that the cost of capital will result in some
form of subsidization. "Perhaps the only feasible solution is to require that the
regulated and nonregulated activities each issue equity capital that would be
traded in the market. '6" Nonetheless, no one seems to have a better idea as to
how to separate competitive and noncompetitive portions of a utility.
3. Technical Standards
A related problem associated with the issue of access to the bottleneck
facility is that of technical standards. Several difficulties are associated with the
requirement of technical standards. First, the antitrust court has retained
jurisdiction over many of the standards. Second, standards do not address the
cross subsidy concern. Third, a multiplicity of standards could emerge and
effectively create barriers.685 The chairman of the FCC indicated that federal
policy would emphasize opening access to competitive technologies through open
network architecture, a reduction on the restrictions on the holding companies,

" Lavey, supra note 673, at 105.

6' Id. at 120.
6wId.

"'

at 105.

Id. at 106.

68 See P. HUBER, supra note 33, at 3.53 to 3.54.
Ioj.HORNING, R. LAwTxON, . RAcsm, W. POLLARD. D. JONES & V. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 87.
Trebing, A Critiqueof Structure Regulation in Common CarrierRegulation, in TELECOMMUNICATION
REGULATION TODAY AND TOMORROW 121, 165 (E Noam, ed. 1983).
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and faster capital recovery. In particular, the chairman stressed increasing the
technological factors which would reduce costs, while increasing demand for
telecommunications services.68 A decision of a federal court of appeals
concerning the preemptive effect of the FCC's ONA requirements, 687 however,
may mandate increased state activity.68
4. Administrative Commitment
One of the ironies of "deregulation" is that the administrative commitment
may actually increase, and there will be little assistance from the relevant federal
agency. (A Government Accounting Office report noted that the FCC enforcement
is likely to be minimal, because it has fewer than twenty auditors to devote to the
task, with the result that the agency could conduct a full audit once each 16
years.68 9) States are likewise limited in the resources which can be brought to
bear, and these must be spread among many different areas of regulation other
than telecommunications.
It is also important to remember that the decision to adjust regulation is
not purely commercial. There is a highly political element to it as well. As noted
previously, deregulation carries with it significant impacts on labor and consumer
expectations.6 ° As part of its administrative commitment, the commission might
do well to open the process to hearings and the record which can be made by that
process. The political response is likely to be less reactive if the process itself is
one which is perceived as fair, open, and grounded on a substantial record.
CONCLUSION

The model of partial regulation offers some insights to the method of
regulating, but does not answer the basic questions of who must win and lose.
That decision will essentially be political. Nor does the model provide an answer
as to what the best approach to regulation in its many facets might be. Only
experience will show whether incentive rate making or price caps will prove more
effective in efficient and adequate service, or if informational tariffs are effective
in the provision of alternative operator services. The strength of House Bill 563
is that it does not bind the commission to a single experiment. The commission

Address of Alfred Sikes, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Telecommunications 1989:
Policy and Regulation in the New Administration, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 30, 1989).
"7

California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
Sikes, After Computer

m. Picking

Up the Pieces at the FCC, 126 PUB. UrIL. FORT. 31, 32 (Aug. 16,

1990).
6" Wilke and Carnevale, Nynex Overcharged Phone Units for Years, an FCC Audit Finds, Wall SL J.,
Jan. 9, 1990, at A6, col. 4.
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can fit the solution to the perceived problem. In that regard, at least, the lack of
direction in the bill is positive. It remains for the commission, however, to
demonstrate the ability to experiment with changing circumstances and political
realities.
In any case, change will continue to occur in the telecommunications
market. 691 New entities and unusual contractual relationships will be the
norm.' "Segmentation and specialization will be critical factors, and the
transition of productivity to price will border on the furious, injecting more
fluidity and change in an environment already beset by rampant change. '693 The
commission will have to change with the environment it is attempting to regulate
if the rhetorical goals are to be met.

69 M. IRWIN, supra note 112, at 6.

adjacent boundary lines dissolve, firms whose relationship in the past was distant or even unrelated
now confront each other as direct competitors and rivals." Id. at 9.
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